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Over the past 50 years decision making research in team invasion sport has
been dominated by three research perspectives, information processing, ecological
dynamics, and naturalistic decision making. Recently, attempts have been made to
integrate perspectives, as conceptual similarities demonstrate the decision making
process as an interaction between a players perception of game information and the
individual and collective capability to act on it. Despite this, no common ground has
been found regarding what connects perception and action during performance. The
differences between perspectives rest on the role of stored mental representations,
that may, or may not facilitate the retrieval of appropriate responses in time pressured
competitive environments. Additionally, in team invasion sports like rugby union, the
time available to players to perceive, access memory and act, alters rapidly between
specific game situations. Therefore, the aim of this study was to examine theoretical
differences and the mechanisms that underpin them, through the vehicle of rugby
union. Sixteen semi-elite rugby union players took part in two post-game procedures to
explore the following research objectives; (i) to consider how game situations influence
players perception of information; (ii) to consider how game situations influence the
application of cognitive mechanisms whilst making decisions; and (iii) to identify the
influence of tactics and/or strategy on player decision making. Deductive content
analysis and elementary units of meaning derived from self-confrontation elicitation
interviews indicate that specific game situations such as; the lineout, scrum or open
phases of play or the tackle situation in attack or defence all provide players with
varying complexity of perceptual information, formed through game information and
time available to make decisions. As time increased, players were more likely to engage
with task-specific declarative knowledge-of the game, stored as mental representations.
As time diminished, players tended to diagnose and update their knowledge-in the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 May 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 609127
fpsyg-12-609127 May 6, 2021 Time: 17:48 # 2
Ashford et al. Decision Making in Rugby Union
game in a rapid fashion. Occasionally, when players described having no time, they
verbalised reacting on instinct through a direct connection between perception and
action. From these findings, clear practical implications and directions for future research
and dissemination are discussed.
Keywords: rugby union, decision making, time, mental representation, situation, self-confrontation
INTRODUCTION
At all levels of participation, the game of rugby union is an
intense physical contest, where frequent high-speed collisions
and forceful contacts define each phase of the game (Garraway
et al., 2000; Reardon et al., 2017; Tee et al., 2018). The
increasing physical demands of the sport that have come with its
professionalisation, has been matched by a focus on developing
the physical robustness of all players (Cunniffe et al., 2009; Austin
et al., 2011; Tee et al., 2017). Consequently, where physical
markers may have previously differentiated players, the gains
in this area are now becoming more marginal (O’Connor and
Larkin, 2015). A more consistent differentiator of performance in
invasion sports can be aligned with expertise in game intelligence
and decision making (Farrow and Raab, 2008; Memmert, 2011;
O’Connor and Larkin, 2015; Gleeson and Kelly, 2020). This
work shows that players, both individually and collectively, must
be able to consistently select the appropriate courses of action
to meet their intended goal, to score more points than their
opponent (Richards et al., 2012, 2017). Given these consistent
findings, supporting a coach’s understanding of and role in
developing this skill set seems crucial (Bar-Eli et al., 2011).
The significance of player decision making in invasion
sports is emphasised by the ever-increasing volume of research
dedicated to making sense of it (Toner et al., 2015; Araújo
et al., 2019; Raab and Araújo, 2019; Williams and Jackson,
2019; Gleeson and Kelly, 2020). Currently, there is no agreed
perspective on how players make decisions or, in turn, how
coaches can best develop their players decision making (Araújo
et al., 2019; Raab and Araújo, 2019; Williams and Jackson, 2019).
Instead, three distinct views have emerged that offer different
interpretations of the role of cognitive mechanisms within a
players decision making process (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002;
Raab, 2003). Predominately, these differences centre on the
presence or absence of memory representations that facilitate
the selection of a course of action (Cappuccio, 2015; Raab and
Araújo, 2019). The information processing view is that decisions
are made through a deliberate and conscious interaction with
memory representations, which have been formed over time
(Toner and Moran, 2015; Birch et al., 2019). Conversely, the
ecological view is that decision making occurs through a direct
connection between a player and their environment, without
reference to memory representation (Cappuccio, 2015; Raab
and Araújo, 2019). Finally, the naturalistic decision making
view is that conscious recourse to memory representations is
dependent on the typicality of the information presented to
the decision maker (Klein et al., 1986, 2010); typical situations
reduce reference to memory representations (Macquet, 2009;
Macquet and Kragba, 2015; Johnston and Morrison, 2016). The
divergency in viewpoint has catalysed authors to explain findings
in different ways and adopt distinct terminology to capture
similar concepts. The question of language is also confounded
by conflicting practical implications offered across perspectives
(Richards and Collins, 2020). Unfortunately, coaches are left to
navigate through convoluted solutions to an intricate practical
problem. To temper these differences, Ashford et al. (2021)
developed a communal language, housed in a unified conceptual
framework, which attempts to facilitate the assimilation of
knowledge borne from each perspective and to progress collective
understanding of player decision making (Figure 1).
The unified conceptual framework compartmentalises
decision making into three components: the game; the player;
and the coach. None are mutually exclusive, as they interact
with the other (Passos et al., 2008; Richards et al., 2017). The
Game sits at the centre, as the goal and rules of the game interact
to create problems that both the Player and the Coach need
to solve. The player interacts directly with both the game and
the coach, by performing shared solutions to the problems
the game presents (Ashford et al., 2021). The Coach acts as a
central agent in (co)creating, sharing and developing a view of
FIGURE 1 | A unified conceptual framework for player decision making in
invasion team sports (Ashford et al., 2021).
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the game with players through on and off field planning and
delivery of coaching.
For players, the decision making process is actuated by the
perception of The Game (Correia et al., 2012; Johnston and
Morrison, 2016). Rules create the landscape of contextualised
game information that players, in their quest to achieve the Pre-
Lusory goal (i.e., to score more points than your opponent; Suits,
1978), are individually and collectively required to act on (Correia
et al., 2012; Macquet and Kragba, 2015; Johnston and Morrison,
2016; Birch et al., 2019). Furthermore, the rules constrain players
to select from a finite list of legal actions (Ashford et al., 2020).
Through interaction with the game, decision making of
The Player is, in part, governed through task dependent
Perception of Information (Ashford et al., 2021). Research has
demonstrated that skilled perception is task dependent, that
is, player’s visual fixations and verbal descriptions change in
line with changes in the demands of the task, presumably
as they search for means to a successful outcome (Roca
et al., 2011, 2012, 2013). Moreover, expert players demonstrate
an improved connection to the information offered by the
performance environment over time (Abernethy et al., 2008;
Esteves et al., 2012; Araújo et al., 2019; Williams and Jackson,
2019). Players’ perception of game information is inextricably
linked with an Individual and Collective Capability to Act
(Silva et al., 2014; Richards et al., 2017); more specifically,
players Actions-for the Game, Knowledge-of the Game and
Knowledge-in the Game. Actions-for the Game are shaped by
the physical (e.g., speed) (Passos et al., 2012) and technical
(Paterson et al., 2013) attributes of players. With experience,
game information and relevant capabilities become coupled and
refined, as inherent understanding of action capabilities more
effectively guides the player to highly salient game information
(Jackson et al., 2006; Davids et al., 2008). Knowledge-of the Game
connects the search for game information and the selection
of a relevant capability to act together through a deeper
understanding of why specific decisions are more appropriate
in one situation than another (McPherson and Vickers, 2004;
Poplu et al., 2008; Lex et al., 2015; Johnston and Morrison,
2016). This characteristic of expertise has been attributed to the
development over time of task-specific declarative knowledge
stored as verbal and/or visual memory representations (Birch
et al., 2019). Additionally, it has been proposed that players
are required to update their knowledge-in the game in order
to adapt to changes in expectations (Macquet and Kragba,
2015). So, when new information arises, such as an opposing
player showing unexpected behaviour, player’s situation-specific
knowledge requires updating (McPherson and Vickers, 2004).
Finally, within the framework, the Coach is responsible for
creating a Common Frame of Reference to facilitate the collective
response of their players to the game (Tee et al., 2018; Ashford
et al., 2021). There is a general consensus across perspectives
that the coordination of team play is a product of reference to a
global top-down shared mental model (Richards et al., 2012, 2017)
and the local bottom-up self-organisation of players through a
shared perception and response to game information (Steiner
et al., 2017; Ribeiro et al., 2019a,b), which the coach can influence
by developing their players’ capabilities. However, at this point,
this common ground remains conceptual (Steiner et al., 2017;
Ribeiro et al., 2019a; Richards and Collins, 2020) as empirical
research has been reduced to the study of top-down (Richards
et al., 2012) and bottom-up (Bourbousson et al., 2010, 2011)
approaches alone (Richards and Collins, 2020). In response, the
current study investigates when, how and why players adopt top-
down (shared mental model) or bottom-up (shared affordances)
decision making processes (Richards and Collins, 2020).
In developing the unified conceptual framework Ashford et al.
(2021) created a view on the, often disputed, role of cognition
in decision making in team sports (Raab, 2003). The framework
proposes that it is important to understand what cognitive
mechanisms facilitate decision making in team sport, when,
where and why. The work of Changeux and Dehaene (1989),
Changeux (2009) have offered a view on the presence/absence of
memory representations from the school of neurobiology;
“What is the mechanism that links them together to form a
uniquely meaningful entity? This question – known among
neurobiologists as the binding problem – is far from being settled”
(Changeux, 2009; p. 54).
Similarly, the purpose of this paper is an empirical
investigation into what mechanism is used by rugby union
players, when, where and why in their decision making. Mahlo
(1974) once suggested that a players decision making in
team invasion sports, will sit on a continuum between direct
perception, a process of analysis and execution, with memory
acting as a mediator between perception and analysis. Conversely,
Changeux’s (2009) work in neurobiology and neuropsychology
has suggested that humans synaptic processes that account for
analysis decision making processes, may be too slow to deal
with the speed of game situations. Interestingly, this justification
forms the conceptual basis for a direct relationship between
perception and action offered from the ecological approach to
decision making (Raab and Araújo, 2019). Changeux (2009)
has championed the presence of memory representations within
their work, suggesting that even when situations remove the
possibility for conscious thought, representations create neural
embodiments of meaning that allow humans to satisfy a
situation. That is, even when players rely on intuition and non-
conscious decision making when the time to analyse is absent,
networks of neurons fire in a synchronized fashion through
mental representations that are deemed meaningful over time.
This evidence offers the view that meaningful representations,
stored in memory are the central mechanism for effective
decision making.
In light of the evidence reviewed, one way a deeper
consideration of the presence or absence of mental
representations can be investigated is to explore different
sport-specific contexts within which players are making
decisions (Bar-Eli et al., 2011; Birch et al., 2019). The laws
of rugby union create game situations that vary drastically in
the complexity of information, time available to decide and
the desired technical/physical requirements (Tee et al., 2018).
Similarly, Raab (2003) suggested that all game moments within
team sports possess a level of cognitive complexity, which is
defined by the amount of choices, attributes, and time available
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to a player within a decision making moment. Moreover, he
hypothesised that placing emphasis during practice on the
development of different forms of capability to act would have
specific advantages, which depend on the cognitive complexity
of the task environment. Raab found that novice handball
players who had developed explicit knowledge-of the task were
advantaged when cognitive complexity was high, whereas those
who had developed actions-for rather than knowledge-of the
task (i.e., implicit learning) were advantaged when cognitive
complexity was low (Raab, 2003). Similarly, Basevitch et al.
(2019) compared expert and near expert soccer players intuition
and option generation in a decision making task. Participants
were required to pick a first option and follow up with other
appropriate actions to video footage, but were also required
respond to occluded images at 400 ms, 200 ms and 0ms
in both cued and non-cued environments. Their findings
demonstrated that experts intuition and option generation
were complimentary of one another across both conditions. At
400ms option generation was deemed more successful, whilst
at 0ms and in a non-cued environment, their first option was
significantly more successful. Time available seemed to coincide
with their decision making process. These findings from Raab
(2003) and Basevitch et al. (2019) offer an implication that
the application of decision making processes at an individual
level may depend on the demands of different game moments
(Araújo and Bourbousson, 2016).
Raab (2003) suggested that investigation into implicit or
explicit cognitive processes within team sports must consider
the role of the environment where one must question
whether a cognitive mechanism, whether absent, good or bad,
rational or irrational, may be best understood relative to its
contextual surroundings (Raab, 2003). Consequently, specific
game situations may demand a player’s use of meaningful
cognitive mechanisms to make decisions (Raab, 2003; Lex et al.,
2015). For instance, the time (Basevitch et al., 2019) and options
(Raab, 2003) offered to players by game situations may demand
an implicit coupling of perception and action resulting in
player’s self-organisation (Passos et al., 2008; Raab and Araújo,
2019), intuition and heuristic driven decision making (Raab
and Laborde, 2011; Raab and Gigerenzer, 2015), diagnosis of
limited options rapidly (Macquet and Fleurance, 2007; Macquet,
2009) or deliberate evaluation of situational probability and
mental rehearsal of possible courses of action (Macquet, 2009;
Macquet and Kragba, 2015). Furthermore, at a collective team
level, situations of high cognitive complexity may benefit from
reference to a global top-down shared mental model (Richards
et al., 2012, 2017; Richards and Collins, 2020), whilst situations of
low cognitive complexity may be best to rest on the local bottom-
up shared perception of, and response to game information by
team members (Correia et al., 2012). Therefore, the objectives
of this study were clear; (i) to consider how game situations
influence players perception of information; (ii) to consider
how game situations influence the application of cognitive
mechanisms whilst making decisions, more specifically players
actions-for, knowledge-of and knowledge-in the game; and (iii) to
identify the influence of tactics and/or strategy, such as a common
frame of reference, on player decision making.
Recent research considering player decision making in team
invasion sports have adopted self-confrontation interviews to
collect meaningful data, which present players with footage
of their past actions in order to stimulate verbalisations of
their experiences during the event (Macquet and Kragba, 2015;
Johnston and Morrison, 2016; Gleeson and Kelly, 2020), such
as their lived decision making experience (Varela and Shear,
1999; Macquet, 2009; Bourbousson et al., 2010, 2011). The
current study adopted this approach to consider the perspective
and thoughts of the player in the context of a single team
invasion sport, rugby union (Gleeson and Kelly, 2020; Richards
and Collins, 2020). In an attempt to mitigate the fallibility
associated with data generated through verbalisation methods
(Cappuccio, 2015; Raab and Araújo, 2019), the self-confrontation
process was initially framed along a continuum, where players
were able to classify their decision making as No-thought, Fast-
thought or Slow-thought (Macquet, 2009; Macquet and Kragba,
2015; Johnston and Morrison, 2016). Considering the research
aims, we hypothesise that individual players would describe
their decision making dependent on particular game situations
where decisions were an implicit (no thought) direct connection
between their actions for the game and their environment
(Cappuccio, 2015; Raab and Araújo, 2019); fast and frugal
through updating their knowledge-in the game (Bennis and
Pachur, 2006; Schulz, 2018); or slow and deliberate in an offline
fashion through their knowledge-of the game (Richards et al.,
2017; Raab and Araújo, 2019). Whilst from a team perspective,
we hypothesise that players would share instances of implicit
(no thought) bottom-up organisation of players through a
shared perception and response to game information (Ribeiro
et al., 2019a,b). fast and frugal interactions with teammates
(Araújo et al., 2015) and slow top-down coordination (Steiner




Sixteen adult rugby union players from a team in the highest
tier of British university (UNI) rugby (n = 8) and a professional
(PRO) rugby team (n = 8) volunteered to take part in the study
TABLE 1 | Player positions by population.
UNI PRO
Position Position
Player 1 Full-back Player 1 Fly half/centre
Player 2 Scrum-half Player 2 Wing/fullback
Player 3 Hooker Player 3 Tight head prop
Player 4 Outside centre Player 4 Hooker
Player 5 Inside centre Player 5 Hooker
Player 6 Loose head prop Player 6 Outside centre
Player 7 Wing Player 7 Second-row
Player 8 Second-row Player 8 Fullback
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(see Table 1 for playing positions). The UNI players ranged
in age from 20 to 27 years (M = 22.5 years, SD = 2.1 years)
and had been playing rugby for 7-22 years (M = 14.5 years,
SD = 4.5 years). The PRO players ranged in age from 19 to
29 years (M = 24, SD = 3.42 years) and had been playing rugby for
11 to 17 years (M = 14.6 years, SD = 2.3 years). Within the UNI
group, two players had previously played professionally whilst
another two had represented England students. In alignment with
Swann et al. (2015) both groups of players have been identified
as semi-elite populations, as the PRO Team participate in the
second tier of English Rugby Union, whilst the highest tier of
British University rugby union now require’s players to train
as full time athletes and regularly results in players progression
to the highest tier of Professional rugby. For the purpose of
this study findings have been separated by group to identify
similarities and differences in accordance with the study aims
(Johnston and Morrison, 2016).
Game Footage
UNI and PRO matches were filmed at the half-way line adjacent
to the rugby pitch. The camera was operated throughout to
ensure that all players included in the study were identified.
Following each match, the individual player’s actions, and the
game context (situations) were analysed by each team’s dedicated
performance analyst. The player analysis was conducted within
24-h of the game using SportsCode Elite software (V11, Hudl,
Lincoln, Nebraska, United States of America). This approach was
taken to minimise the disruption of player’s typical interaction
with performance analysis between games and because in-house
analysts are better able to perceive individual and collective
decisions and actions in reference to their teams’ tactical
approach, whilst utilising repeatable methods of analysis. For
every decision identified, the analyst clipped the footage 5 s
prior and 7 s after the decision in order to capture the situation
leading into and the outcome of the action, respectively. On
occasions when actions lasted longer than 7 s the clip was
extended. Video clips for each player were compiled into a film
in the order they occurred during the match. For the purpose
of data collection, each player’s video clips were then edited
into a changed order using Adobe Premier Pro video editing
software (Adobe, San Jose, California, United States of America)
by the lead author. The rationale for this was to monitor the
consistency of player’s decision classifications (Kinrade et al.,
2015) and to reduce a possible learning effect between stages
of the procedure.
Procedure
The data collection procedure took place in a mutually agreed,
quiet location within 48-h of the final whistle of each game. UNI
and PRO players completed this process twice (n = 32 games).
Within the procedure, players were required to complete three
stages of data collection; (i) unstimulated recall of involvements,
actions and decisions made within the game; (ii) decision
classification; and (iii) a repeat of decision classification alongside
a self-confrontation interview. Each stage of the procedure was
recorded using a dictaphone.
Stage 1: Unstimulated Recall
Prior to watching any game footage (Gleeson and Kelly, 2020),
players were first asked to verbalise their involvements, actions
and decisions within the game. The rationale for collecting
unstimulated data was to identify what actions and decisions
players could recount from the game without prior stimulation
from game footage. This method served a clear purpose, as
it enabled a consideration of the trustworthiness of the data
captured during stage 3 of the procedure (Bourbousson et al.,
2011). Furthermore, unstimulated verbalisations could then be
cross referenced to stimulated verbalisations of the decision
process during the same game moment.
Stage 2: Decision Classification
On both data collection occasions’ classifications of No-thought,
Fast-thought and Slow-thought were defined for the players by
the first author. No-thought classifications were defined as a
decision where no conscious thought took place in leading to
an action, Fast-thought classifications were defined as a rapid
conscious decision leading to an action, whilst Slow-thought
classifications were defined as a slow deliberate conscious decision
where a number of options are considered leading to an action.
Following this, players had the opportunity to ask clarification
questions before beginning the video classification task. The task
commenced when players were shown a video of their actions and
decisions in the order they occurred during the game. Each clip
was played once, and the video paused at its conclusion where
the final frame remained on the screen. This initiated players to
classify using a second laptop (with screen occluded) whether
the clip represented a No-thought, Fast-thought or Slow-thought
decision. Players had a 5 s limit to classify each decision before
the researcher played the next clip (Mulligan et al., 2012).
Stage 3: Self-Confrontation Interviews
After responding to all clips once, the players repeated the
decision classification process by watching the same clips
presented in a different order. In the second round of decision
classification the 5 s time limit was removed. Instead players were
asked to verbalise how they came to their decision through self-
confrontation elicitation interviews (Von Cranach and Harré,
1982; Feigean et al., 2018; Gleeson and Kelly, 2020). Within self-
confrontation interviews players are likely to digress to reflect-
on action or self-rationalise and justify their decision making
(Gleeson and Kelly, 2020). Therefore, the interviewer encouraged
the re-enactment of their lived experiences during the game via
prompts such as “why slow/fast/no thought?;” “what are you
thinking?;” “what information are you responding to?;” or “talk
me through what happened?”.
Data Analysis
The reliability of the UNI and PRO players No-, Fast- and
Slow-thought decision classifications between stages 2 and
3, were confirmed by calculating the intra-class correlation
coefficient (Chronbach’s alpha: UNI = 0.92; PRO = 0.89). For
the qualitative data, all interviews were audio recorded and
transcribed verbatim. Each transcript was read numerous times
to ensure familiarity and understanding (Taylor and Collins,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 May 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 609127
fpsyg-12-609127 May 6, 2021 Time: 17:48 # 6
Ashford et al. Decision Making in Rugby Union
2019). Due to the large amount of qualitative data drawn from
the unstimulated and self-confrontation interviews, the data was
analysed in two stages. The first stage employed qualitative
coding and theme development procedures commonly used
in sport coaching research (Braun et al., 2016; Miles et al.,
2020; North et al., 2020). Initially, verbalisations were attributed
to Unstimulated responses and No-thought, Fast-thought and
Slow-thought decision classifications. Within each component,
the unified conceptual framework for decision making in team
invasion sports was employed to conduct a deductive content
analysis (Johnston and Morrison, 2016; Kyngäs et al., 2020).
This allowed a hierarchy of deductive themes to emerge -
perception of information, actions-for, knowledge-of, knowledge-in
and a common frame of reference – which helped comparisons
within and across populations to be made. Analysis was
enhanced by using qualitative software (QSR NVivo12). To
examine the relation between the frequency of No-, Fast-,
and Slow-thought decision classifications made within each
deductive theme by each player group chi-square tests of
independence were performed.
The second stage explored each prescribed theme deductively
to abduct “elementary units of meaning” in relation to each study
aim (Thereau, 2003; Macquet and Kragba, 2015; Gleeson and
Kelly, 2020). Furthermore, units explored player’s experiences
of cognitive, perceptual, psychological, sensorimotor, physical
and environmental events, inclusive of the game situation,
teammates, opposition and the coach (Varela and Shear, 1999;
Gleeson and Kelly, 2020). Where possible, codes were created
in line with cognitive mechanisms underpinning the unified
conceptual framework for decision making in team invasion
sports (Ashford et al., 2021). Thus, due to the range of
verbalisation data collected, inductive reasoning was used to
abduct data that could not be satisfied by underpinning deductive
themes. Again, results were compared across populations
(Johnston and Morrison, 2016).
In accordance with recommendations by Tracy (2010), the
credibility of the data was appraised through triangulation
of quantitative decision-classification and qualitative self-
confrontation interview data (Macquet, 2009). To safeguard
sincerity in our approach a critical friend, independent of
the authorship, was invited to review, comment and edit our
deductive analysis and construction of elementary units of
meaning for both UNI and PRO groups of players (Smith
and Caddick, 2012; Cronin and Lowes, 2016). Finally, rigour
was elevated by only including players who completed the full
procedure twice1 and by conducting interviews within 48 h of
the final whistle of the game in an agreed and consistent location
(Tracy, 2010).
RESULTS
To signpost the reader through the results, numerous examples
of raw data have been included in Tables 2-4. Firstly,
1Five UNI players and two PRO players completed the procedure once, therefore
their data was removed from the study.
Table 2 displays elementary units of meaning constructed from
Unstimulated verbalisation data, where player’s recollections
were aligned to their decision classification and stimulated
verbalisation during stage 3 of the procedure. Figure 2 presents
quantitative findings, comprised of a deductive content analysis,
specifically the collation of player’s decision classifications
and references to each deductive theme; the perception of
information; actions-for the game; knowledge-of the game;
knowledge-in the game and a common frame of reference
(Ashford et al., 2021). Table 3 demonstrates elementary units of
meaning constructed to explore the decision making process and
cognitive mechanisms described during stimulated verbalisations
of decision making processes. Finally, data emerged, displaying
how four distinct game moments in rugby union; the lineout;
the scrum; defensive situations and offensive situations2, are
commonly associated with distinct forms of decision making
processes (see Table 4) as hypothesised by Raab (2003). However,
the association is not just complexity, but also time available.
Deductive Content Analysis
From the sixteen players who took part, 1896 decisions
were verbalised during self-confrontation interviews (UNI:
826; PRO; 1070). Players in the UNI group verbalised 111
Unstimulated decisions whereas players in the PRO group
verbalised 110 decisions. Both groups of players referenced their
actions-for the game most often (UNI = 50%: PRO = 50%),
followed by perception of information (UNI = 31.43%;
PRO = 22.22%) and a common frame of reference (UNI = 20%;
PRO = 17.78%). Knowledge-of (UNI = 7.14%; PRO = 6.67%),
and knowledge-in (UNI = 2.86%; PRO = 3.33%) the game were
referenced least often.
During the stimulated self-confrontation interview process,
83 and 119 No-thought, 318 and 471 Fast-thought and 314
and 370 Slow-thought decision classifications were made by
the UNI and PRO players, respectively. Figure 2 presents the
2The lineout is a set-piece phase of play, which involves the ball being thrown
back into the field after it has left (Sayers, 2005). It must have at least two, but
commonly includes four to seven, players from each team standing perpendicular
to the sideline, 2 m apart with the first player at least 5 m away. The team in
possession requires a player to throw the ball straight down the middle of the
two lines, whilst two players’ lift a jumper into the air to catch and receive the
ball (Croft et al., 2011; Sayers, 2011, 2005). Opponents may also lift someone to
compete for the ball. Initiation of movement is often sparked by a ‘caller’ from
the team in possession the ball, who then decides where the ball will be thrown
and caught. The scrum is also a set-piece situation, which involves a maximum of
eight players from each team (forward) forming three rows that are bound together
to compete for the ball; (the front row; hooker and props; second-row’s and back
row; flankers and number eight; Trewartha et al., 2015). The two sides must then
bind together to compete for possession of the ball in a coordinated pushing action
(Hendricks et al., 2014; Trewartha et al., 2015). For the team in possession of the
ball, the scrum is seen as an opportunity to launch attacks, whilst opponent’s often
aim to disrupt or steal the ball back (Trewartha et al., 2015). Physical domination
can often result in the penalisation of an opposing team (Hendricks et al., 2014).
Finally, offensive and defensive moments of the game are defined by the team in
possession of the ball (Tee et al., 2018). Rugby union is a unique sport as when a
tackle occurs, a physical contest for possession of the ball follows (Tee et al., 2018).
This area of the game is called a ruck where an attacking team will support a ball
carrying player by securing the ball, before it can be passed away to a player in
open space. Conversely, the defence are firstly required to tackle a player, which
then provides an opportunity to win the ball back (Tee et al., 2018). Therefore,
defensive and offensive situations repeatedly ebb and flow between moments of
open-phase play and tackle situations.
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TABLE 2 | Thematic analysis of Unstimulated verbalisations, stimulated verbalisations and decision classifications of the same game moment [number in brackets
denotes the number of player references to this theme].







“We said look at front door options instead of going out
the back. Cause they were sort of chopping off us and
biting on us, so thought we’d put it into an open play
move I hit **** on a short ball and he went through and
put **** in and scored.” (UNI Player 4, Game 2)
“I was initially looking outside me, as I thought that’s where
the support would be coming from as we had pre-called that
it would be a hit. It was a pre-call pat hit. **** should be an
option, but once I make the break I look outside straight





“Next play we’re all spaced up and I fly upon to the last
man and then he gave a pass away and I had to shift off.”
(PRO Player 2, Game 1)
“I always assess the first guy on the lead and then push off
onto that shoulder ball I was a little slow on that and then it
was the case of my winger overselling himself, and in




“I could see there was a bit of space on the outside
which I saw the winger had chased in on me. Went to
look to go either side but he’d actually closed me off
really well so I fended him off to get me a bit of space and
span into where the forward were all stood and opened
up.” (PRO Player 2, Game 1)
“I didn’t think I would beat him for pace because he was
backpedalling and definitely had the angle on me. They had
cover, I knew I could beat him one on one but was very much
aware of the cover chasing me, so attempting that would
slow me a bit, so my thought process was let’s keep us on
the front foot.” (PRO Player 2, Game 1)
Fast-thought Opponents
movements
“There was one missed tackle where their winger broke
through and me and James both sort of went for him at
the same time and both missed it.” (UNI Player 1, Game
1)
“He broke the line and **** sort of was in behind and he was
shouting at me I’ve got it I’ve got it so I sort of stepped out
the way and then as he missed him went for him, so my
process was quite slow” (UNI Player 1, Game 1)
Slow-thought Teammates
movements
“We could of thrown to the back of the lineout but we
haven’t had any success with the back ball.” (UNI Player
8, Game 1)
“The **** ball hadn’t been on all day which is the back ball on
the lineout which we really haven’t been hitting to much
anyways & it’s wet and rainy so it’s a much higher risk” (UNI




“So whenever I noticed him being close to the ball I just
ensured I was there quickly to blast him out, or make
sure that when he was tackling me, when I was on the
floor to constantly make a second effort so he couldn’t
get hands to the ball.” (PRO Player 5, Game 1)
“In the build up to it, just before we get the ball (pod of three),
I’m looking at the defensive picture for the red scrum cap.
The risk goes up when he’s there.” (PRO Player 5, Game 1)
Fast-thought Intentions
“We had a scrum just before half time, which didn’t go as
well – one of the worst scrums of the game – we didn’t
get out the blocks very well.” (PRO Player 3, Game 1)
“So the hit doesn’t go to well, and then he’s sort of on the
outside, and I’m thinking at this time about getting forward so
he can’t get around me.” (PRO Player 3, Game 1)
Slow-thought Outcomes
“Before the game I’d noticed that **** their 7 was really
strong over the ball, so whenever I noticed him being
close to the ball I just ensured I was there quickly to blast
him out, or make sure that when he was tackling me,
when I was on the floor to constantly make a second
effort so he couldn’t get hands to the ball.” (PRO Player
5, Game 1)
“It just became a thought process of if he’s there just smack
him and get him away. If I went over the top of him there, he’s
in a strong position and he just wouldn’t of moved. It was
definitely a conscious decision to get my head under his
shoulder and just smack him off the ball. My thought process




“And then defensively in the lineouts we stole, from me
jumping at the front and then there was one other that
**** got his finger tips on then obviously I remember the
last 6 minutes in pretty good detail.” (UNI Player 8, Game
2)
“So we decided before the game to line up slightly in front of
their jumpers. Then the picture I see makes sense as they’re
just going quick and to the middle I think it was their front
jumper who turned deliberately” (UNI Player 8, Game 2)”
Fast-thought Roles &
responsibilities
“First thing was the kick chase of the restart so we knew
previously that they were going to go long so set off, kept
the line and I could chase out.” (PRO Player 2, Game 1)
“I’m going up I’m looking at who’s around and who’s
catching it because they’re going to do different things,
because if it’s a 9 catching it I know has going to do
something different to a bigger guy.” (PRO Player 2, Game 1)
Slow-thought Tactics
“There was one instance where the ball came to me, but
the defender was on me so I had to tip it on really
quickly.” (PRO Player 3, Game 2)
“As I got the ball I saw that **** hips instantly turned into
toward me. So I gave the ball to **** to gain a better





“My decisions following that point was to think ‘right, let’s
keep it simple’ and as a lineout caller I tended to back
myself a lot. I was like right ‘I know my shit’ so I’m going
to call it to myself.” (PRO Player 7, Game 1)
In this game we had to get to trusting what we were doing,
the fact that it was personnel messing up, i.e., a not straight,
gives you confidence – it’s not like your calling is wrong.”
(PRO Player 7, Game 1)
Game context
“It went well, yeah we Ginned off me. Then there was a
lot in midfield in this game and we went into the game
trying to win the midfield.” (UNI Player 2, Game 1).
“I’m not reacting to anything, I know we’re in midfield on the
half way and really that’s a game plan type thing it’s like we’re
on the half way they’ve got a good defensive line so.” (UNI




“I stayed hugging the touch line and called flash which is
our call to jump back down on the blind side.” (PRO
Player 2, Game 1).
“Saw it was on, called the flash my options were to flatten up
or stay deep to get the ball and make that decision as easy
as possible for our ten, basically I could see that their was a 6
in front of me, and I knew I could beat him into that space.”
(PRO Player 2, Game 1)
Fast-thought Common
language
The **** denotes names and terms that have been removed for confidentiality and anonymity.
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TABLE 3 | Thematic analysis of UNI and PRO Rugby Union players verbalisations of their decision making process [number in brackets denotes the number of
references made to theme].
Population Classification Deductive themes Meaningful Units Raw data examples
UNI No thought Perception of information
(45)
No time (5) “That’s no thought again, sort of turned at the last second didn’t have time to think.”
Opponents movements (22) “Because it’s just like, he changed direction so you’ve just got to make it.”
Teammates movements (7) “**** made contact with him and I just assume he would and then he got passed and I’ve just got to hit him. It
was an impulse decision.”
The ball (10) “Just the balls there, it’s bouncing around like a pin ball so just dove on it. I can’t even remember doing that after
the game.”
PRO No thought Perception of information Audio (3) “Just heard something and reacted with an offload.”
(56) No time (10) “I didn’t have time to look up to scan, which put us in an awkward position.”
Opponents body position (6) “There’s no real thought there, was just get over it, deal with any threats and get low.”
Opponents movements (19) “That’s just a reaction, he’s come down the channel, can’t really explain it more than that.”
Teammates movements (12) “We’ve got a big emphasis on ‘pushing through’ at the moment, so when I see a break like this one it’s almost
just instinctive to sprint and follow.”
The ball (6) “There just no logical decision here, I’ve not assessed the actual ruck area, I’ve just seen the ball and gone for it.”
UNI Fast thought Perception of information
(110)
Audio (4) “The thought behind it is the 9 has picked to go left and then I’ve heard the bounce back call, so that’s given me
time to get up.”
Opponents body position (3) “I definitely thought about how I was going to clean him out. But that was at the last second when I hit him, I hit
him and he didn’t move so I had to react and roll him out.”
Opponents movements (39) “So here I’m thinking he passes to me and I go under, but I didn’t see the 14, until the last second which is when
I gave it. I only really had two options to pass or have a go, but it changed from have a go to pass at the last
second when I saw the 14.”
Teammates movements (24) “Bit of a fast thought. Initially it wasn’t my tackle, so it was whether to go in or not. I see that it’s a semi dominant
carry so I had to go in to help out.”
Defensive picture (24) “Space was there, no need to wait and give them time – let’s just go.”
Offensive picture (4) “I think I seen, I looked behind the line so I knew that they had no real options on outside, so I shot up a little bit,
it was just fast thought to shoot up a little bit.”
Time (12) “It is my job to look out for the overthrows and tips but not always expecting them to stuff up their line outs.
When it does though I’ve got like a split second to react. My first response is always to just carry.”
PRO Fast thought Perception of information
(164)
Audio (6) “Also I heard as I took a step forward the ball player out the back say shadow as he’d obviously seen a clear
opportunity to act.”
Haptic (3) “So the hit doesn’t go to well, and then he’s sort of on the outside, and I’m thinking at this time about getting
forward so he can’t get around me.”
Opponents body position (20) “Just remember looking at his body shape, there just wasn’t an easy place for me to put a shoulder in, it looked
like I might simply hit and bounce off. Which led me to think, right let’s just wrap him up it’s the safer option. I’ve
only got the ability to go through this thought process because of the time that’s available when I’m chasing. But
I’ve put this down as fast thought as at the last second I knew I couldn’t get to the ball. As the kick was coming
down was where I had to make the decision of when and how to tackle.”
Opponents movements (25) “Again that’s a similar sort of thing, my first decision is to join or stay away depending on which side he steps, or
where he runs, indicated whether I go in or not.”
Teammates movements (24) “I remember wanting to pass to the fullback coming short but he stayed wide, which meant my decision was
made for me, so I pumped and bought the ball back in and tried to run into the gap myself.”
Defensive picture (26) “But as it developed I can remember their tail man at the lineout looking directly at our 9. Which if he chases
leaves a nice healthy gap for me.”
Offensive picture (20) “It’s a fast thought process because I’ve seen that they had a lot more numbers than we did on that side of the
ruck so I’ve just arse ended across and continued to go across.”
UNI Slow thought Perception of information
(95)
Defensive picture (26) “Cause this one was more there wingers were dropping really deep as they thought we were exiting. I was
looking up every time I received the ball to see how deep their wingers were on each touchline. They had a
minimum of two players drop back each time and just kick it long and push both wingers backward instead of
having them both run onto the ball.”
Offensive picture (13) “Their numbers up, the defensive set up we’re going to have to wedge. They’ve got 21 coming short, so I stick
on him and then the ball goes so I wedge off”
Opponents movements (18) “It was my man, sort of lined him up but just yeah he’s always my man, I’ve just shot up a bit and yeah it’s a slow
thought. Because I’ve had 5 seconds to hit him, sort of when you’re in the line waiting for the ball to come out I
was thinking I’m going to hit him, he’s my man sort of thing.”
Teammates movements (13) “That was just us running a Nike – **** was running a hard line and then one of their lads jumped out and **** was
the only option in my head.”
Time (25) “We had our line set and I saw him calling for the ball, so I had time to get my head up and make the tackle.
Yeah, I knew that that was my tackle.”
PRO Slow thought Perception of information
(99)
Audio (11) “So I hear from the outside that **** calls ‘chilli’ so I look up and see we’ve got numbers. So as I get the ball I’m
looking to see how the man I’m engaging reacts, but he stay’s on us so I make the pass. If he hadn’t of stayed
on us, I would have carried into the space. ‘Chilli’ pretty much means lets move the ball wide because there’s
space.”
Defensive picture (16) “Another slow thought, as I’ve pre-called the lineout. They gave me the space where I called it so I took it.”
Offensive picture (17) “Erm, I’ll say slow thought for that one. 2. I was quite unsure of who my man was. I didn’t hear too much
communication from inside me so I had to stay a little bit longer than I would have liked before I could push off
and get to the shadow. He was quick as well which made it tougher. Yeah so, slow thought didn’t have much
from inside me, didn’t have much from outside me so I had to process all the information myself to make the
decision.”
Haptic (8) “Trying to maintain shape and working on my shoulder are the things I‘m consciously working on and in my set
up working with ****, he’s a really good prop if he moves forward, but If he moves forward he struggles, so there’s
a lot of talk with him and a lot of set up with him before trying to get him forward, so I can get him through, we’re
always saying get your inside shoulder through and your left foot up so he’s nice and square so he can get
through.”
Opponents movements (14) “I’m assessing whether the 9’s running, no, get out and get on his inside, and then I just folded round the corner
when asked.”
Teammates movements (15) “But then it changed as the pass went to him instead and it disrupted things. Really, he should just carry, but
instead he goes ahead with the plan and tips the ball on to me and I don’t really want it, so I drop the ball. I mean
its poor skill from me I should still take it. Because I expected something different, its resulted in a mistake.”
(Continued)
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Time (18) “That whole time I was assessing the options that were available. Where we need to press, who’s inside
me, I think we were out of backs as I only had forward inside me so this changed the way I defended, as I
was a lot more passive to give these guys time
UNI No thought Actions-for the game (37) Reaction (33) “Erm, because I didn’t see him, so I just turned and he was there so I just hit him. He had the ball so, that
was my instinctive response in defence.”
Rehearsal (4) “It’s like if I’m one on one 90% of the time I’ll go off my left foot because 90% of the time I’m looking like
I’m going to go in the other direction, so the defender just turns. Is that cause you’re better off your left
foot. Yes, definitely I know that. I just spend all my time getting people to go that way so I’ll just go the
other way.”
PRO No thought Actions-for the game (57) Reaction (52) “No thought, he fumbled it, then it just kind of happened. I had no idea what he was going to do because
he’d fumbled it, so I just shifted it away straight away.”
Rehearsal (5) “That’s just me following my process – we’ve rehearsed where he should be so I just throw it.”
UNI Fast thought Actions-for the game (55) Self-awareness (12) “Well there was either two options there for me, carry or pass. I seen that winger back so I gave it, it
wasn’t pre-planned or anything.”
Intentions (41) “You see that they’re setting up for the pick and go, then you’re just waiting for them to move. You know
what you have to do and you’re just responding to their body position. Just waiting for them, which
triggers the reaction.”
Misjudgements (2) “He did a really good job and he didn’t bite in, so I tried to take the outside centre on the outside and as I
seen him bite in I tried to release the ball out the back and the ball got ripped off me.”
PRO Fast thought Actions-for the game (83) Self-awareness (27) “I know I’m not the best jackler and I know I’m not the best at counter rucking, so the more time spent
driving the player back the more opportunity to slow the ball down.”
Intentions (46) “When I do hit the ground I’m thinking ‘second movement’ as I have to ensure I get the ball back cleanly,
this is something that I just have to do.”
Misjudgements (10) “We need a few more men, the ball came out messey, and whilst the ball was in the air I decided to go for
it rather than cover on the outside. Went in for the ball tried to be smart and absolutely pinged it up and
forward.”
UNI Slow thought Actions-for the game (26) Self-awareness (9) “Again I think I had quite a bit of time to think about it. Because they were passing wide I just had to keep
going off them. I always back myself, like show them the outside and execute the tackle basically.”
Awareness of teammates
capabilities (2)
“Even though their winger was relatively quick he broke the line and **** sort of was in behind and he was
shouting at me I’ve got it I’ve got it so I sort of stepped out the way and then as he missed him went for
him, so my process was quite slow as I could hear **** saying he had the player.”
Intentions (15) “It was more or less the first couple of minutes of the game so for me I’m thinking I need to get that tackle
I need to get that first hit in so if I do that I can get into the game pretty well.”
PRO Slow thought Actions-for the game (40) Self-awareness (20) “I know I’m getting the ball. Had time to think about the pump of the ball, create myself some space and
then drive.”
Intentions (20) “I’m constantly feeling what our hips and shoulder connections are like, when I call the seconds in where
they are so they’re in good positions most of the time it’s fine, if they’re not I’ll ask the referee to blow it up
and reset.”
UNI Fast thought Knowledge-of the game
(22)
Opponent (3) “From watching their game film before this game, I knew that they liked to go quickly on their five man set
up. So we decided before the game to line up slightly in front of their jumpers.”
Roles & Responsibilities (7) “In terms of when we’re coming round the corner of the ruck, we set up in guard, 9, 1, on defence I’m
just then waiting for them to come into my channel. I should have come up there but I’m just waiting to
see if that’s switch happens. Once I see that they’re getting the ball then my brain jogs and I’m reacting.”
Self-awareness (1) “I go through the same process at every ruck, first thing I do is find out what’s happening, find out where
the ten is, where the forward are, first thing that goes into my head is what are we doing? The two three
forward there hitting hard and then who’s going to be out the back. Some people like looking at the gaps
first but I also think, by the time you get there they’re going to have closed that. As my hands go on the
ball then, I have a look at the gap available and then I go for it or the pass.”
Tactics (11) “Once we get to the edge, we tank back in. We do it all the time in training so it’s just a rehearsed rule we
play too.”
PRO Fast thought Knowledge-of the game
(49)
Knowledge of opponents (5) “So, ****, their hooker, I’ve played him before – he doesn’t like scrummaging under your chest. He
obviously enjoys going into the gap, so my thought process was to make it uncomfortable for him. Turn
my right shoulder down and put pressure onto his neck.”
Self-awareness (3) “I definitely know my strengths, I know when I should and shouldn’t go for a jackal, when I’ve actually
assessed the situation. If he falls on his back or exposes his body, that gives me a better opportunity to
go for the ball.”
Knowledge of teammates (2) “He’s a very good offloader, so I knew that his first instinct would be to give the ball so I jumped at the
chance haha.”
Roles & Responsibilities (19) “Here I saw they had got quite far along at the point of contact, so I had to call two round the corner to
defend. I think this call is because we do a lot of it in training and we’ve had numerous bollocking’s over it
as well about being early. I think like we made it so clear, my coach said you might be calling them but
they can’t see it, so be really dramatic about it, wave your arms, pull them and I knew as well that
because they were so far along that we’d definitely need two because their attack had cut off most of the
pack. We have a clear policy of make the space for them to fill it.”
Tactics (20) “I was in position and I know our strategy there is to hit the middle man, he’ll either carry and give a tip to
me and in this instance I’ll just clear that ruck there. Unless we’ve hit a guy that we usually wouldn’t hit or
they tip it on. Normally, so if there’s 3 this guy clears the outside and this guy clears the inside so if it
changes that’s when we have to make the decision to adapt.”
UNI Slow thought Knowledge-of the game
(83)
Knowledge of opponents (4) “Because from the preview of the game I knew where they tend to give up space defensively in the
lineout so I knew where we wanted to attack.”
Roles & Responsibilities (30) “Just because of time, defensive structure, wedge, on the inside of defence, kind of know where they’re
going and the tackle I need to make.”
Self-awareness (10) “I heard the tank call, so I had time to look up and see what I’d run. I was always going to run there, I
hardly ever do look for options, I just go unless there’s a call for a tip, but yeah when I do get the ball I’m
pretty tunnel vision like.”
Tactics (34) “Game plan related one, we’re close to our own line – the decision was to exit so got some blockers in
and I knew I was hitting **** so, despite it being at a bad angle.”
Teammates (5) Well I can see he’s got the ball and I’m kind of deciding when to make the tackle or him to make the
tackle I’m talking to **** on the outside telling him to wedge so I’m making the decision as it unfolds. It
gives me more time to weigh up the situation and make a tackle rather than if I fly into that there’s a risk of
it coming off bad.
(Continued)
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PRO Slow thought Knowledge-of the game
(88)
Knowledge of opponent (9) “We identified him as a threat as he got three turnovers in the previous fixture so. It wasn’t something we’d
prepped as a team, it was something I’d noticed from watching the video, like everyone will know we’ve got to
watch him cause he’s going to cause us some trouble if we don’t look after him. It just became a thought
process of if he’s there just smack him and get him away.”
Roles & responsibilities (38) “At 99% of mauls my role is to get the ball at the back, so there’s no thought process its just my job. Then it
just becomes slow thought based on my feel of how the mauls progressing, is my binding tight, are we low
enough, is the ball on the right hip, it becomes a check and challenge because you’ve got the time to do it.”
Self-awareness (5) “It’s just the time I’ve got to set up, I’m at the back here and we’re further up the pitch so I’m not expecting it
at the front. Then it’s a case of connecting with the line, I got caught on this last week as I was too far ahead, it
was definitely a mistake I was aware of this week and It was definitely conscious as I made my decision.”
Tactics (30) “Slow thought, same premise really it’s a set move, we both know that we’re running hard at the line, all I’m
reacting to is catching the ball, but I know that I’m running that line and picking that hole on that side of the
defender because I have time to. The catch is more the skill than the decision.”
Teammates (6) “Knowing that I’ve got **** and **** chasing with me allows me to go at their pace and knowing all the time that
we can put pressure on him and contain what we can.”
UNI Fast thought Knowledge-in the game
(85)
Change in expectations (57) “Again similar as before, it was the other man’s tackle but he’s stepped into my way, so just reacted to that.”
Game context (14) “Erm, I think I’ve made a bit of a mistake there as I’ve got passed him and he’s just stepped in and I’ve just
reacted to almost a panic tackle to get him down. That was probably happening a bit quicker and like a said
probably a bit of panic. The context of the game as well as they were coming back into it as well.”
Risk/Threat (14) “Just so he couldn’t get up and go again, cause if I don’t go in there he’s just going to get up and keep going,
but if I put a knee on him I kind of I just stop him and get back out.”
PRO Fast thought Knowledge-in the game
(86)
Changes in expectations (46) “As we’re coming round the corner here, I’m not expecting him to be tackled, so I quickly thought ‘right I’m
going to hit this as hard as I can’.”
Game context (15) “I think we turned it over so, for them they were set and ready to attack so all I knew was I had to get into the
midfield and get it out to the wing and we’ll probably get some decent metres on the edge.”
Risk/Threat (25) “But then because my teammates get’s hit and turned there’s a threat of the ball being turned over. So, then I
became conscious that I had to identify the threat and deal with the threat quickly.”
UNI Slow thought Knowledge-in the game
(18)
Change in expectations (9) “Well I had time to think, so it was like I caught the ball quite didn’t catch the ball very well as it was kind of
behind me and then it was just kind of flat D on us.”
Game context (3) “I simply saw a man that I thought I could beat. It was raining, the ball was really greasy and wanted to hold
onto it.”
Risk/Threat (6) “He was a little bit of a threat, it was his first carry so and my first tackle, first involvement didn’t want to fly out
the line. Didn’t want to try and put in a big shot and end up on my arse if you know what I mean. He only had
one or two outside, there was definitely one outside.”
PRO Slow thought Knowledge-in the game
(42)
Change in expectations (10) “I suddenly realised that I was too far ahead of the defensive line and realistically I should be a metre of so
deeper so I’m more connected in the line. Once that pass happens, I know I need to get back and make that
tackle.”
Game context (22) “Again this was a case of awareness on the field. I’m not wanting to take the ball to get personal glory out of
what is a no win situation so told him to carry again, and knew I had to hit that ruck as it’s the wide ruck and
the wingers always in it.”
Risk/Threat (10) “So I knew from looking in front of me that that’s a back, so I’m talking to the man outside of me telling him to
stay with us, because if he has a crack at me he’ll probably do me for pace.”
UNI No thought Common frame of
reference (1)
Common language (1) “Erm the called a hippo shadow but he came up very quickly so I had to sort of, I didn’t even see him until the
last second and then I just flicked it on. Just saw and acted really.”
PRO No thought Common frame of
reference (6)
Common language (2) “That’s just simply getting the ball away from the point of contact, in other words ‘get a shift on’. Not thinking
really, we have what we call a ‘two pass policy’ on turnover to try and get the ball away from where they’re
heavily populating the pitch.”
Tactical rules (4) “I hit the ruck on autopilot”
UNI Fast thought Common frame of
reference (46)
Tactical rules (27) “That’s a fast thought, if 9 doesn’t go in we tank, if 9 does go in we power, but we have said that that is
something we could do differently. So if 9 goes in we could pass off the base, just a little short one to get
outside the tight guys. That’s what we prepare for in training all the time, so there isn’t much thought that goes
into it.”
Common language (15) “It was a pre-call pat hit. Because **** should be an option, but once I make the break I look outside straight
away, so that’s my initial thought on the pass.”
General communication (4) “**** told me just to carry so I just carried, it spilled out the scrum so I just thought set a phase we can go
again.”
PRO Fast thought Common frame of
reference (89)
Tactical rule (50) “We have a tackler + 1 rule, always two in the tackle, because he did step on the inside, my next thought was
just to whack him and try and knock him back.”
Common language (29) “At the time, **** had called two, with his fingers in the air, which meant they wanted two players to fold round
the corner so I knew I had to get to ‘20’ and I was telling my man on my inside that he was at ten. Then they
know that my next job and role is to watch the 9”
General communication (10) “I called for the offload here of **** rightly or wrongly”
UNI Slow thought Common frame of
reference (92)
Common language (38) “Slow thought on that one, my positioning is dictating where he’s going to run, which gives me time to select
which tackle I’m going to make and it happened in that way. It wasn’t like I’d just got up to make a tackle. We
were in a wedge, didn’t mind about the space we conceded just making the tackle. He was a little bit of a
threat, it was his first carry so and my first tackle, first involvement didn’t want to fly out the line. Didn’t want to
try and put in a big shot and end up on my arse if you know what I mean. He only had one or two outside,
there was definitely one outside.”
General communication (6) “When I caught the ball again, if I remember there were a lot of players calling outside me shouting that I had
time on the ball, perhaps I could have given that wide instead of trucking it up the middle myself.”
Tactical rules (48) “I’m not reacting to anything, I know we’re in midfield on the half way and really that’s a game plan type thing
it’s like we’re on the half way they’ve got a good defensive line so, what’s the point in attacking them from here
when we haven’t really got any momentum, had a blocker in so it was like **** was ready for it, tank was set up
so just went through the process for my box kick.”
PRO Slow thought Common frame of
reference (111)
Common language (44) “Here, ‘pepsi’ was called, which was our call for a box kick, which meant we migrated to width and plugged
any gaps so our kick chase was effective as possible. Just becomes habitual.”
General communication (9) “I’m talking to him again, telling him to carry I know that if I carry it I could be pushed into touch.”
Tactical rules (58) “The ball in that situation is pre-programmed to go to him and we had spoken about me taking a tip on to give
us more width before that phase unfolded as we noticed they were quite spaced apart in their defensive line.”
The **** denotes names and terms that have been removed for confidentiality and anonymity.
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“Queen was my only real option, because my original call was a front ball. On the six-man spread, Jack is slow at the front cause we have
to step to and they have a pod set ready. I think a lot of these judgements are just drawn from previous games, having tried this before.
Like I could go check out Jack on a six man, even if they’re set and we’re taller they don’t have to move anywhere, they can just go
straight up if they’re patient.” (UNI Player 8, Game 2).
“That was more of a fast thought. Because we were going to go with a lineout call, but **** see’s that one of the check outs was on so,
every lineout we go in we’ll go in with what we call a ‘movement call’ and then if **** call’s check we all go to that movement.” (PRO
Player 3, Game 1)
“Because from the preview of the game I knew where they tend to give up space defensively in the lineout so I knew where we wanted to
attack.” (UNI Player 8, Game 1).
“This one is slow thought because it’s a lineout call. I’ve got time to think through the process and think about how they’re setting up and
which of our calls are likely to work best. Lineout calling is like a game within a game, in that I’ll look at their game video in the week
leading up to the game and see how they defend. Then I know what options I want to use, off the back of that each line out then goes
onto the next. So we’ve used this lineout and its worked well, then I know that they’re following the dummy pod back – so that will set me
up for another one. So you use one to set up another one and so on and so forth. I’d liken it to a game of chess almost. (PRO Player 7,
Game 1)
“But then I saw that they’d set up 3-1-3 defensively almost, so that they have the people there to sack it right away but in the middle on
our queen ball they only had one person and they’d already disrupted our maul throughout the game already so I decided to go for the
queen ball because they only had one person to stop us, meaning it was more likely for us to get some go forward.” (UNI Player 8, Game
2).
“Pre-called it, we walked in and from the way they’d set up, there was no check outs on. When I walk into the lineout with my hand up it’s
a signal to the hooker that I’m going to call now. Our trigger for the movement is me to call ‘check’. They’d know that If I said it, then they
would know that the ball wasn’t coming to me. When I put my hand up, then the hooker knows, or people know that we’re checking
out.” (PRO Player 7, Game 2).
“So I had time to assess the options, there was no rush and no need for tempo. That was basically the game plan, we knew what we
wanted to do and where we wanted to attack going in and the option was there on that occasion so.” (UNI Player 8, Game 1).
“I’ve got time to think about it. As I said on the last one, the reason why, I’ve bumped him back and gone in behind them. It’s a case of
working out what they’re doing and almost predicting what we’ve seen of them on video from recent weeks. In this game we had to get
to trusting what we were doing, the fact that it was personnel messing up, i.e., a not straight, gives you confidence – it’s not like your
calling is wrong, like where you’re expecting it to be on and then its not.” (PRO Player 7, Game 1)





“On this one we were quite well set, but we don’t win the hit, so we’re in good shape and we’ve got good pressure but because we don’t
get through it was a bit of a struggle. So their lose head steps back and their tight head steps up and then we had that whip in the
scrum.” (PRO Player 3, Game 2)
“I just go through my processes, based on how it feels, If I feel dominant I’ll look to be aggressive, if not I’m a bit more reactive.” (UNI
Player 6, Game 1)
“It almost goes a bit like a checklist, so when you go down on crouch you go for your bind, I’m always looking to win that, that way
you’ve got him sitting on his heals. Then I’m looking to crash through the marks, win the race across the gap and get that 1, 2. Lock the
scrum down and put him in bad shape. We spend a long time prepping them through video footage, so **** will step out and he’s got a
negative bind so my intentions were to clamp him down so he couldn’t get his arm up, so he was already in a bad position. (PRO Player
5, Game 1)
“It’s a slow thought here, we get the free kick at the scrum and **** asks us whether we fancy a scrum, so we go for a pen. Our call is










“I hesitated here, as I knew that if he didn’t get the ball as the first threat I needed to push off if they hit the guy out of the back. They were
doing this quite a bit and they would block you with that lead runner. I was consciously thinking to chop my feet, so I could quickly react if
they went out the back and thinking just don’t engage him because that will leave a gap. I’ve got to stay on him on the hard line and then
the man out of the back which we call a ‘gun’. But what they were doing well was that the two front line runners would bump you in the
defensive line so you couldn’t then get to the man with the ball out the back. If they’re just carrying the ball and there’s no passing option
or threat then you don’t need to think about it. But when there’s a gun option I have to wait, I can’t just hit, if he pulls it out the back I’ve
got to get passed the tip option who’s trying to block me and then get to him – which is probably why I miss the tackle. (UNI Player 8,
Game 2)
“Probably quite a bit slower than the others, again because I’ve got to defend the forward, defend the lead which is the hard line and
runner coming through, then I have to get to the shadow, which is the running line out the back. Then as soon as the guy out the back
passes, then I’ve just got to stay high on the inside. Ideally, if I could stop that play there and then I’d do it but because they played it
quite well I knew immediately that I wouldn’t be able to do that. So I looked after him, then had to go and help my man outside of me.
What got me was the amount of decisions I had to make in the play, I think I was probably fast on the decisions I made but there was so
many decisions I had to make, I found myself recalling doing these things in training and dealing with multiple threats. For us, we always
have a principle – ‘always defend the threat’. So defend the ball, if I’m the next man I have to defend him and then I push off.” (PRO
player 1, Game 1).
“I remember thinking that we were stressed and under pressure on the edge [space toward the touch line of the pitch] and I’ve waited on
the ‘lead’ too long, tried to get out and just missed the tackle.” (PRO Player 6, Game 2)
“I’m on 9 here, in guard 9, 1 and I’m telling myself the same thing, ‘don’t get beat,’ and yeah he went I wasn’t tight enough and ended up
getting beaten.” (UNI Player 8, Game 1)
“I have a specific job here at ‘20’ as when 9 runs I’ll shout to the inside man, and I’d hope he’d cover me better than he actually does
here. So as 9 picks I know that he’s my primary focus and then I’m just pushing off, but as he didn’t pass he steps back inside. The
whole time I’m in this position I’ve got a role to fulfil, pushed off a little bit as I know there is a threat on the outside, but I know that that is
my primary role. I was hoping our ten would step up a little bit and plug that, which stops their 9 being able to dart like that, but in the end











“So I had a look up thought that **** is at ten and we’re in what we’d call a lead shape, a lead shadow – which might also be called a
wedge, 2/3 etc. . . and I made that call because of identifying the attacking personnel I had around me.” (PRO Player 1, Game 1)
“I was initially looking outside me, as I thought that’s where the support would be coming from as we had pre-called that it would be a hit.
It was a pre-call pat hit. Because **** should be an option, but once I make the break I look outside straight away, so that’s my initial
thought on the pass.” (UNI Player 4, Game 2)
“That’s just because with **** I’m thinking he’s going to carry here and when he got stopped I was kind of expecting the ball in an offload
position, but when you actually get it I’ve got no idea where I’m going or what I’m doing so I literally just got the ball and reacted to
defenders and someone bit on me which like I just went the other way and just tried to run.” (UNI Player 2, Game 2)
“So here, he doesn’t get tackled as fast as I’m expecting, so my mindset changed, and changed quickly. I don’t want him to get held up
so I’m just going to whack him and get him going forward, which made it easier for **** to hit the deck.” (PRO Player 3, Game 1).
The **** denotes names and terms that have been removed for confidentiality and anonymity.
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of No-, Fast- and Slow-thought decision classifications for UNI and PRO groups for each deductive theme.
relative frequency of No-, Fast- and Slow-thought decision
classifications made within each deductive theme. Chi-squared
tests of independence confirmed differences in the frequencies
of decision classification for each deductive theme (all X2 (1,
N > 137) > 17.52, p < 0.01). Observation of Figure 2 shows that
for both groups of players Fast-thought decision classification
were most frequent within the perception of information
theme. Fast-thought decision classifications were also prevalent
within the actions-for the game theme, as were No-thought
classifications; Slow-thought classifications were relatively less
frequent. Within the knowledge-of and knowledge-in the game
themes, no decisions were classified as No-thought and very
few decisions were classified as No-thought within the common
frame of reference theme. Furthermore, within the knowledge-of
the game theme there is an observable difference in the relative
frequency of Fast- and Slow-thought decisions between the two
player groups. A large majority of decisions of UNI players were
Slow-thought whereas PRO players show more of a balance
of Fast- and Slow-thought decisions. Within the knowledge-in
the game theme Fast-thought decisions were most prevalent
for both player groups. Finally, within the common frame of
reference theme while Slow-thought decision classifications were
most prevalent for both groups of players, this seemed to be
particularly the case for UNI players.
Elementary Units of Meaning
Unstimulated Verbalisations
Table 2 demonstrates that players, were able to recall and
verbalise their decisions and thought process leading to a
decision. These verbalisations were cross-referenced to player’s
stimulated references to the same decisions during stage 3
of the data collection procedure. This analysis indicates that
player’s often recalled decisions that were later classified as Fast-
Thought and Slow-Thought, but not No-thought. Additionally,
the units of meaning derived from unstimulated verbalisations
were representative of the units abducted from Fast-thought
and Slow-thought decision classifications. Player’s often only
verbalised their decision making process in relation to an action
that was significant in memory following the game (See Table 2).
Self-Confrontation Interviews
Table 3 exhibits the deductive and inductive elementary units
of meaning that emerged from each deductive theme; perception
of information, actions-for, knowledge-of, knowledge-in and a
common frame of reference.
Perception of Information
No thought
Players described intuitively responding to audio information
and having no time to think about their decision;
“Just caught the ball without any time to make a decision, felt
afterward that I didn’t know what decision to make. Didn’t know
whether to pass it, give it to **** out the back. I just carried.” (PRO
Player 6, Game 2).
Players described perceiving discrete visual information, with
specific reference to; their opponents’ movements, opponents body
position, teammates movements and the rugby ball. For both
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populations’ players verbalise reacting without conscious thought
to their opponents’ or teammates movements. For instance,
“Just tackled him, I’ve just stood up and he’s ran into me.” (PRO
Player 6, Game 1).
Players also verbalised instances where seeing the ball initiated
unconscious responses;
“The ball just kind of pops up, it’s not expected yeah I didn’t know
or had a thought about who was around me or what was around
me so, it was just catch and carry.” (UNI Player 4, Game 2)
Fast thought
For both groups the perception of information is referred
to most frequently within Fast-thought classifications (> 34%
of responses in both player groups). Eight elementary units
of meaning included; audio information, haptic information,
opponents body positions, opponent’s movements, teammates
movements, defensive and offensive pictures, and time. Players
from both groups refer to their opponents and teammates
movements frequently;
“He’s stepping in, I’ve sort of anticipated him stepping in as well,
then I thought about it, but it was definitely a last second thing.”
(UNI Player 5, Game 1).
Players also refer to the perception of global information in the
form of offensive and defensive pictures, for example;
“As I’m walking in I’m scanning to see what picture they’re
showing me and then I’ll call wherever the space is.” (PRO
Player 8, Game 1).
However, PRO players verbalised the perception of discrete
information more often than the UNI group, such as their
opponent’s body positions. The majority of these instances were
verbalised during their decision making in the tackle area;
“As the tackle unfolded he started to fall toward the touchline
at which point I pulled him and pressed his shoulders and head
down toward the touchline. It was fast thought based on feel of,
oh we can actually turn the ball over here, so I manipulated his
body rather than going for the ball so he’d go out of touch.” (PRO
Player 2, Game 1).
Slow thought
Units included; audio information, haptic information, the
defensive and offensive picture, opponents’ movements, teammates
movements and having time to perceive. Analysis demonstrates
frequent references to more global sources of game information
regarding the defensive or offensive picture provided by their
opponents;
“The picture changes as we go up, I knew that I could get
pressure on him as he didn’t have an option on the outside.” (PRO
Player 2, Game 2).
Finally, both populations recall having sufficient time to
perceive and interpret wider sources of game information, their
opponents’ movements and/or their teammates movements whilst
making decisions;
“A lot of time on the ball and a lot of time to compose myself. I
was hoping the ball was going to run dead so when it held up I
still had a lot of time on the ball so, when I picked it up and turned
around I had about 15m to work with and compose myself.” (UNI
Player 3, Game 2).
“I’ve got a lot of time. I’m the third guy away from the ruck so
instantly I know it’s my job to go at their ball carrier.” (PRO
Player 7, Game 1).
In summary, during No-thought verbalisations players
recalled perceiving discrete information due to a lack of time
to see, hear or feel anything else. Whilst during Fast-thought
verbalisations, players referred to the perception of discrete
sources of information; such as opponents’ movements or body
positions, and global information; such as the defensive picture
painted by their opponents to make decisions, whilst the PRO
group recounted using discrete information to make decisions
more often than the UNI group. Conversely, interpretation of
Slow-thought verbalisations indicates that an increase in time
offered by particular game situations results in a tendency to focus
on global information, such as the offensive or defensive picture
provided by their opponents (See Table 3).
Actions-for the Game
No thought
Player’s described reacting unconsciously to game information
through their actions. For example, both PRO and UNI players
describe similar processes in different game situations;
“It was just an instinctive pass on the inside. I’m under a bit of
pressure and there’s my get out.” (PRO Player 1, Game 1).
“I don’t remember what was going on there, I definitely turned it
over but it was bit of an instinct thing to just get the ball back.”
(UNI Player 4, Game 2).
Less frequently, specific individuals on both teams indicated
that rehearsal of actions allowed them to act appropriately. For
example, the Hooker from the PRO group of players (Player 5)
indicated that all of his lineout throws were No-thought;
“That’s just me following my process – we’ve rehearsed where he
should be so I just throw it.” (Game 1).
Fast thought
Players describe moments of self-awareness whilst making
decisions, however PRO players refer to this more frequently than
the UNI group. For example;
“I’m sprinting thinking I’m going to compete in the air, but then
in looking at the flight of the ball and I know that it’s too far
in front of me and I know I’m not going to get to it.” (PRO
Player 1, Game 2).
Players verbalisations regarding their actions-for the game
often referred to having knowledge of their intentions to achieve
a specific outcome. Players from both populations consistently
refer to “knowing,” “having to,” or “needing to” act in a specific
way to solve the problem in front of them. For example;
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 May 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 609127
fpsyg-12-609127 May 6, 2021 Time: 17:48 # 14
Ashford et al. Decision Making in Rugby Union
“I just dropped my shoulder to try and get through. I’m first
to the ruck, my decision is always to clear any threat.” (PRO
Player 3, Game 1).
Slow thought
Slow-thought verbalisations regarding players actions-for the
game were more infrequent than No-Thought and Fast-thought
classifications, but often recounted clear thought processes
during decision making, irrespective of whether the outcome was
successful or not. For example, UNI and PRO players recall being
self-aware during their decision making;
“Because we ran a kick chase line, he was my opposite number
and I nominated him, as my man, tracked him.” (UNI Player 2,
Game 2)
“But instead I made him step back on my inside shoulder and he’s
actually quite a good stepper for a big bloke, then I just thought
I need to lunge at his ankles here to get him.” (PRO Player 6,
Game 2)
Players also described being more aware of the capabilities
of their teammates within their verbalisations of slow thought
decisions;
“The reason being was ****, the prop, told me to run near him
and he does it in training it’s like a proper old man’s trick just like
nudging someone. So like, as I caught it I heard that and I thought
s**t where’s that coming from. I looked up and saw him.” (PRO
Player 5, Game 2).
Within Slow-thought decisions, most verbalisations of player’s
actions-for the game tended to be dependent on intentions
derived from Knowledge-of what action was appropriate for the
game situation specifically.
To summarise, No-thought verbalisations referred exclusively
to players unconscious reaction to perceptual information, whilst
individual player’s made reference to the importance of rehearsal.
Interpretations of the Fast-thought data suggests that their
intentions, shaped by their perception of information, guided
resultant action in time-pressured situations. Whilst, Slow-
thought classifications indicated that action-for the game depend
on a player’s, self-awareness, intentions and an awareness of their
teammates action capabilities (See Table 3).
Knowledge-of the Game
Fast thought
Within fast thought classifications, players occasionally referred
to their knowledge-of their opponents, roles and responsibilities,
self-awareness and tactics. However, the results indicate that PRO
players verbalised these units more often. Furthermore, they
referred to tactical self-awareness and knowledge-of teammates
when coming to fast thought decisions;
“He’s a very good off loader, so I knew that his first instinct would
be to give the ball, so I jumped at the chance haha.” (PRO Player
5, Game 2)
Slow thought
Players referred to consciously using knowledge-of their;
opponents, roles and responsibilities, self-awareness, tactics and
their teammates whilst making decisions (>23% of responses).
The main difference between the groups verbalisations rested
on the PRO players making reference to knowledge-of their
opponents to inform their decision making more frequently;
“I looked up here and saw their 7 **** was in front of me,
who’s their most effective jackler, so I had time to think if he
makes the tackle there’s less chance of him then making the
turnover. Just thought, get him to make the tackle, stay tight.”
(PRO Player 5, Game 1).
The vast majority of slow thought verbalisations regarding
players knowledge-of the game make reference to the importance
of executing specific roles and responsibilities that are essential
within particular game situations;
“I have a specific job here. So as 9 picks I know that he’s my
primary focus and then I’m just pushing off, but as he didn’t pass
he steps back inside. The whole time I’m in this position I’ve got a
role to fulfil.” (PRO Player 4, Game 2).
On numerous occasions both groups refer to perceiving and
acting based on their tactical approach to the game;
“That’s our game plan, to play the bottom corners and that’s
why I looked. Yeah that is the reason why I’ve looked. Erm,
I’ve just kicked it because he was a bit high in the line.” (UNI
Player 2, Game 1).
Thus, knowledge-of the game was rarely made reference to
during UNI and PRO players Fast-thought verbalisations but
on occasion, players referred to the team’s tactics and the roles
and responsibilities that guided their decision making. The
Professional players made reference to tactical self-awareness
and using knowledge-of their teammates during Fast-thought
classifications. Analysis of Slow-thought responses indicate that
when players had time, they often referred to their knowledge-
of tactics, roles and responsibilities as navigators of perceptual
search and choice of action. In addition, the Professional
players knowledge-of the game extended to knowledge of their
opponents’ tendencies, tactics and behaviour (See Table 3). No




Player’s referred to their knowledge-in the game most often
during Fast-thought decision classifications. In coding these
verbalisations into elementary units of meaning, players across
both groups described that their expectations of the situation
were regularly unsatisfied. Verbalisations indicate that players
had to adapt quickly to changes in expectations regarding game
situations. UNI players referred to adapting to changes in
expectations frequently (>67%) during verbalisations of Fast-
thought decisions, indicating a tendency to form unreliable
expectations within game situations.
“I’m pretty sure I was supposed to run a 3 on that one, but I ended
up getting the ball unexpectedly.” (UNI Player 4, Game 1).
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In addition to changes in expectations, players from both
groups describe the impact of game context on their decision
making in Fast-thought instances;
“That was probably happening a bit quicker and like a said
probably a bit of panic. The context of the game as well as they
were coming back into it as well.” (UNI Player 1, Game 2).
Finally, UNI and PRO players refer to dealing with legitimate
risks or threats to their offensive or defensive integrity. PRO
Player 5 describes an instance where he’d noticed an opposing
player, who he knew to be strong at competing for the ball, in
close proximity as he was tackled;
“Then as I land, I’m more conscious of my groundwork because
of the threat of ****, so I’m kicking my hips and rolling, so he just
didn’t have a target to get on the ball.” (Game 1).
Slow thought
Players verbalised having to update their knowledge-in the game
less often during Slow-thought decision classifications. However,
units of elementary meaning demonstrate that when they did it
coincided with similar themes; changes in expectations, the game
context and realistic threats or risks to offensive or defensive
integrity. However, PRO players made reference to the game
context more often than the UNI players;
“Again this was a case of awareness on the field. I’m not wanting to
take the ball to get personal glory out of what is a no win situation
so told him to carry again” (PRO Player 1, Game 2).
Player’s form expectations of situations from their perception
of the game situation and their knowledge-of the game,
however these expectations are frequently unmet (See Table 3).
Furthermore, following recognition of this, players tended to
take the first option available to them. This is most evident
within verbalisations of Fast-thought decision classifications
where knowledge-in the game is referred to consistently. During
Slow-thought verbalisations, the PRO players made reference to
the use of game context, such as the score, the time left in the
game and their awareness of offensive or defensive momentum
more often than the UNI group. No reference to knowledge-in
the game was made during No-thought verbalisations.
Common Frame of Reference
No thought
On five occasions PRO players referred to common language
and tactical rules initiating action without conscious thought.
For example, PRO Player 3 verbalised having “hit the ruck on
autopilot” (Game 2) without thinking about it. One UNI player
referred to the use of common language whilst verbalising a no
thought decision.
Fast thought
Players often referred to the use of tactical rules to come to
decisions within their Fast-thought classifications. For example,
multiple players from the Professional group refer to a “tackler
plus one” rule instigated by their coaches. Players often describe
having to make a rapid judgment as to whether it is their
responsibility to join the original tackler in order to slow the ball
down;
“We have a tackler + 1 rule, so if you are going to go in there, be
effective and slow the ball down.” (PRO Player 7, Game 1).
Similarly, UNI Player 8 indicated that they too follow tactical
rules, for instance when their scrum half is caught up in the ruck
situation, they resort to a typical course of action;
“That’s a fast thought, if 9 doesn’t go in we bullet. If 9 goes into the
ruck it’s a pick and go, simple.” (Game 1).
These rules tend to coincide with the use of shared
terminologies that are included in a wider common language
between teammates and coaches. For the PRO players, 13 terms
were verbalised that captured tactical rule’s and plays, whilst UNI
players verbalised 16. Player’s recounted hearing, or using these
terms to guide the decisions and actions of themselves and others
in time-pressured situations;
“I was screaming 3 and because I was coming around the corner, I
had a bit more depth. When I got outside the second last defender,
it was essentially a 3 vs 1 on the edge” (UNI Player 4, Game 2).
In addition to common language, players also described
general communication between them and their teammates in
coming to decisions;
“**** told me just to carry so I just carried” (UNI
Player 6, Game 2).
Slow thought
A common frame of reference was referred to frequently
during verbalisations of Slow-thought classifications (both
groups > 30%). Elementary units of meaning indicate a clear
role of verbal and non-verbal communication between players
when making decisions. These were coded into; a shared
common language; general communication between teammates;
and tactical rules. Both groups describe shared understanding
of a common language that influences players collective and
individual decision making by guiding perception to more
relevant game information, informing teammates of information
players are unable to perceive visually, and shaping clear
intentions of how they should act given the circumstances. For
example;
“He then brings us in for a “truck” which is a slow decision to carry
the ball into contact. He then say’s “apple,” which is a box kick so
I’ve got to get wide for the kick chase.” (PRO Player 5, Game 2).
“That was just us running an addidas, **** was running a hard line
and then one of their lads jumped out and that meant **** was the
only option.” (UNI Player 4, Game 2).
These terms also actuated players decisions to execute
rehearsed tactical rules. For instance;
“The call reminds me of my course of action after I’ve thrown the
ball in. At 99% of mauls my role is to get the ball at the back, it’s
just my job.” (Professional Player 3, Game 1).
Finally, players recall the use of general communication
between them and their teammates whilst making collective
decisions;
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“Our aim is generally to get the ball to the edge within our team
pattern so there was no point me carrying it because we’d have had
a weaker clear if I’d carry it, so I told him to carry it and talked him
through carrying it and then knew I was hitting the ruck straight
away.” (PRO Player 1, Game 1).
To summarise these findings, players refer to a common frame
of reference across all decision classifications (See Table 3). Both
UNI and PRO players refer to the use of a common language that
is made up of specific terminologies that guide players collective
perception of information and actions-for the game within their
decision making processes. These terms house tactical rules for
players that are included in a wider common language, resulting
in planned and prescribed actions and movements. Such terms
are referred to most often during Slow-thought verbalisations,
whilst occasionally in Fast-thought and on a handful of occasions
during No-thought classifications.
Game Moments
Table 4 highlights the perceptual information, cognitive
mechanisms and tactical strategies verbalised by players in
specific game situations, most specifically, the lineout, the scrum,
defensive situations and offensive situations.
Lineout
Individual players from each team were given sole responsibility
for running and calling their lineout. Players used a common
language shared between their forward unit to initiate the
movement coordination of a throw by the hooker, lift by two
supporting players and jump and catch by the jumper. Players
described having a menu of tactical rules, housed under particular
shared terminologies, that were selected before the game after
watching and identifying how their opponents tended to behave.
For Slow-thought verbalisations, UNI Player 8 and PRO Player
7, both verbalise how they would enter the lineout with a pre-
call, which they would immediately execute if their opponents
presented the space to them. If not, they referenced that a
Fast-thought was required to perceive the defensive picture
rapidly before calling a second term (or body movement) that
teammates would respond too. Both players consistently refer to
the importance of having time to perceive and assess the initial
defensive picture before adapting.
Scrum
Scrum situations were exclusively classified as Slow-thought
where players referred to the execution of a “checklist” in
response to haptic game information (See Table 4). The data
implies that this checklist is formed from knowledge-of what
action is appropriate given the feel of their scrummaging
position. Alongside this, both teams had a common language that
would initiate how they intended to approach the scrum, that is,
being aggressive or being more conservative.
Defensive situations
Defensive situations ebbed and flowed between open phase play,
and tackle situations. For both instances, players verbalised that
tactical rules often dictated what the players role, responsibility
and intentions should look like. But, on multiple occasion’s
the players described being consciously aware of too many
pieces of game information with too little time, resulting in
paralysis by analysis and missed tackles. The data implies that
the tactical rules drove players to focus less on the perceptual
information provided by opponents and more on rules associated
their own movement behaviour. For example, in open phase
play, players who played the position of centre, were required
to abide by the rule of waiting on the threat of a hard line of
running, before moving toward the other option which more
often than other positions, which often resulted in missed tackles.
Similarly, forward verbalised their role and responsibility of their
positioning next to the ruck situation, their position demanded a
role (terminology) and responsibility (which opponent). Player’s
verbalised feeling internalised pressure in these moments which
resulted in numerous missed tackles.
Offensive situations
Offensive situations also shifted between open phase play
(carrying, passing and kicking) and tackle situations (tackle, ruck,
maul). Nonetheless, both teams often refer to a framework of
play that drove their positioning and intentions. Slow-thought
decisions often coincided with moments of open phase play,
for instance players verbalised calling a tactical play housed
under a common term to pre-plan their action response to the
defensive picture provided by their opponent (See Table 4). No-
thought and Fast-thought decisions coincided with moments
where players initial assessment of situational probability was
unsatisfied resulting in a need to reassess or react to game
information. These moments were often verbalised during local
interactions between attackers and defenders and within the
tackle situation and ruck.
DISCUSSION
Sixteen adult rugby players conducted three stages of data
collection within 48 h of two competitive fixtures to: (i) consider
how game situations influence players perception of information;
(ii) to consider how game situations influence the application
of cognitive mechanisms whilst making decisions; and (iii)
to identify the influence of tactics and/or strategy on player
decision making. (Raab, 2003; Bar-Eli et al., 2011; Araújo and
Bourbousson, 2016; Birch et al., 2019; Bourbousson et al., 2019;
Ashford et al., 2021). Players were required to verbalise their lived
decision making experience during self-confrontation interviews,
which were framed along a continuum of No-thought, Fast-
thought and Slow-thought (Varela and Shear, 1999; Macquet,
2009; Bourbousson et al., 2010; Macquet and Kragba, 2015;
Johnston and Morrison, 2016). Verbalisations were subject to
two stages of analysis including; a deductive content analysis
in relation to Ashford et al.’s (2021) unified framework for
decision making in team invasion sports; and the deductive
and inductive collation of responses into elementary units of
meaning (Thereau, 2003; Macquet and Kragba, 2015; Gleeson
and Kelly, 2020). As anticipated, our interpretation of the data
indicates that game situations have a clear impact on players
perception of information and the cognitive mechanisms used,
or not used, within the decision making process. Furthermore,
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tactics and strategy seem to have a significant impact on player
decision making.
Perception of Information
Verbalisations of fast and frugal decisions coincide with
references to the perception of global (Lex et al., 2015; Johnston
and Morrison, 2016), and more discrete (Jackson et al., 2006;
Johnston and Morrison, 2016) information. Our findings suggest
that players perceive game information on a global scale;
such as the width of the defensive line, identifying space in
backfield or identifying advantages and disadvantages between
attacking and defensive numbers, as pictures that invite particular
courses of action (Lex et al., 2015). This is comparable to
the findings of Johnston and Morrison (2016) who compared
perceptual strategies of skilled and less-skilled rugby league
players. They suggested that skilled players perceive cues of a
global nature whilst lesser able players focus more on discrete
local information, such as the body positioning of opponent’s
(Johnston and Morrison, 2016). In contrast, our findings
demonstrate that both groups of players perceived discrete
information as frequently as global information when making
decisions classified as Fast-thought. Players make reference to
their opponent’s body positions, opponents’ movements and
teammates movements as actuators of the decision making
process (Passos et al., 2008; Correia et al., 2012, 2013).
Interestingly, the perception of global, or discrete information
seems dependent on the situational context placed on the
decision maker. The perception of global information, such as
the width of the defensive line, often coincided with moments
where players were waiting for the game to come to them
in open phase play, such as a backline waiting to receive the
ball at the lineout (Macquet and Kragba, 2015). Instead, recall
of discrete information during player verbalisations tended to
correspond with tackle situations, for example, a one vs one
situation between a ball carrier and a tackler (Jackson et al., 2006;
Correia et al., 2012, 2013).
The analysis of No-thought and Slow-thought verbalisations
demonstrates that players are presented with variances in time
available to make decisions during a game of rugby union (Raab,
2003). The No-thought data implies that players often refer to
having no time to perceive game information, whilst during
Slow-thought verbalisations both groups often allude to having
increased time, providing an opportunity to view a global array
of visual perceptual information. These findings provide further
evidence to the idea that perception is task dependent as semi-
elite player’s verbal descriptions change in line with different
game situations (Lenzen et al., 2009; Roca et al., 2011, 2012, 2013).
In rugby union, the rules dictate that a contest for possession of
the ball occurs every time attacking and defensive players meet
(Ashford et al., 2021). Subsequently, our findings demonstrate
that players who are involved in the contest for possession, such
as the ball carrier, tackler and supporting players, have minimal
time to perceive and act on game information. In such time
pressured situations, a psychological refractory period may occur,
where players are unable to perceive a secondary source of game
information (Araújo et al., 2004; Maslovat et al., 2013). Therefore,
players must rely on the initial perception of discrete information
in the local array, such as their opponent’s movements and body
positions (Correia et al., 2013). Conversely, players who are not
involved in the contest, are given time to perceive a global array
of offensive or defensive pictures offered by their opponents, to
communicate and collectively execute a decision for the next
phase of play (Johnston and Morrison, 2016).
Players communicated the use of different perceptual sources,
presenting visual (Johnston and Morrison, 2016), acoustic
(Davids et al., 2008) and haptic information (Lenzen et al.,
2009), whose use is predicated on the position they play and the
game situation (Raab, 2003). Whilst the majority of decisions
within open play are actuated by global or discrete visual
information, players also perceive acoustic information from
teammates, especially in backline positions. Furthermore, in
particular game situations such as the scrum (See Table 2)
players mostly rely on the perception of haptic information
to make decisions. For instance, Props from the UNI and
PRO playing groups indicate that the conscious awareness
of haptic information; such as the strength of their physical
scrummaging position and their bind between themselves, their
teammates and their opponents actuates their decision making
process. Consequently, inferences suggest that rugby union
coaches should guide players to global, discrete, audio or haptic
perceptual information based on the time available to a player
within particular game situations.
Actions-for the Game
Analysis of verbalisations making reference to player’s actions-
for the game suggest that UNI and PRO players perception
of information is guided by their physical (Passos et al., 2012)
and technical (Paterson et al., 2013) capability to act (Ashford
et al., 2021). Within Unstimulated, Fast-thought and Slow-
thought data, players often recount being consciously aware
of their physical and technical capabilities when perceiving
and acting on game information. In contrast, analysis of No-
thought verbalisations often unearthed tendencies to refer to an
self-organised response, which in the majority, still resulted in
positive outcomes. Players from both teams also rarely verbalised
decisions where they had misjudged perceptual information. This
may present evidence that both UNI and PRO players physical
and technical capabilities to act are coupled with highly salient
game information (Davids et al., 2008; Passos et al., 2008; Correia
et al., 2013). Thus, players perception of information may, at
times, depend on a refined connection to their technical and
physical capability (Jackson et al., 2006; Esteves et al., 2011;
Paterson et al., 2013).
For the majority of No-thought classifications, players could
not remember nor verbalise how or why they came to act in
such a way. Instead, they referred to reacting without thinking
or based on a feel for the situation. This may suggest that
within these moments, the driving mechanism of the players
decision making process is a successful (or unsuccessful) forming
of a direct online relationship between game information and
their technical and/or physical capabilities without need for
memory representation (Cappuccio, 2015; Wilson et al., 2018;
Raab and Araújo, 2019). It is important to note however, that such
verbalisations of implicit self-organisation were rare, yet this may
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be due to the methods adopted within this study. Furthermore,
despite players indicating that they’d decided based on feel or
through reaction, they often impressed wider knowledge of what
was required to satisfy the situation within their verbalisations.
Subsequently, these findings from No-thought classifications
may be interpreted in two ways; first, as evidence for a direct
and enactive relationship between perception and action within
the decision making process (Cappuccio, 2015) or second,
evidence for Changeux’s (2009) view, that even in situations
where players are denied access to conscious thought, neural
embodiments of meaning stored as representations allow for
players to satisfy the demands of the game situation. Analysis
of the data suggests that players had an instinct of what was
right given the game situation, suggesting that Changeux’s (2009)
view may be better placed to explain these findings. Additionally,
whilst verbalising a particular No-thought classification, a PRO
player made reference to the importance of rehearsing his
lineout throw in hope of removing conscious thought from
his decision making process. Interestingly, our data suggests
that despite these preferences, the decision of where to throw
was still cognitively driven through memory representations,
as the player refers to having to listen, interpret and act on
a common term which initiated where the ball needed to be
thrown (McPherson and Vickers, 2004; Richards et al., 2012,
2017). Instead, the player’s desire to remove conscious thought
from the decision, was in reference to the execution of the
throw itself, perhaps aware of the need to free resources for the
decision making process.
In contrast, elementary units of meaning abducted from Fast-
thought and Slow-thought classifications suggest that player’s
actions are often driven by situation specific intentions. However,
these intentions are determined by a player’s deep declarative and
procedural understanding of what, how and why to act on given
game information (Anderson, 1982; Macquet and Fleurance,
2007; Lenzen et al., 2009). This challenges a widely accepted
contemporary view that the coupling of a player’s perception
and action are bound directly (Passos et al., 2008; Raab and
Araújo, 2019). Instead, the data of the current study suggests
that perception, whilst coupled and refined with salient game
information, is often predicated by the retrieval of conscious
memory representations that initiate what action is selected
and why (Lenzen et al., 2009; Macquet and Kragba, 2015;
Johnston and Morrison, 2016). Furthermore, players described
being self-aware of their technical and physical capability during
the decision making process. Interestingly, these moments
demonstrate a tendency to engage in meta-cognitive processes
in fast paced game situations, where players consciously assess
whether they possess the technical, and/or physical capability
to influence the outcome positively (Price et al., 2019, 2020).
Finally, the interpretation of data suggests that statements that
describe the relationship between perception and action as one
directly connected, for instance that players must “perceive to
act and act to perceive” (Fajen et al., 2008; Silva et al., 2013),
should be extended to account for the interceding mechanism
of memory representation (McPherson and Vickers, 2004). That
is, in order to perceive to act and act to perceive (bottom-
up), one must possess the knowledge of when, where and why
to perceive and act accordingly (top-down; Anderson, 1982;
Ashford et al., 2021).
Knowledge-of the Game
The influence of game situations are clearly demonstrated in our
findings of the deductive content analysis. No references
were made to knowledge-of or knowledge-in the game
during verbalisations of No-thought classifications (Raab,
2003; Bar-Eli et al., 2011), whilst reference to the use of
knowledge-of the game was verbalised only on occasion during
Fast-thought classifications. Instead knowledge-of the game
was predominately recounted during Slow-thought decision
classifications where players were presented with more time and
an increased number of options to select from. Within these
instances, player’s share how their knowledge-of opponents,
tactics, roles and responsibilities, self-awareness and teammates
all influenced their decision making process (Gréhaigne et al.,
1999, 2005; Richards et al., 2012; Macquet and Kragba, 2015).
Our findings suggest that in time rich situations, memory
representations, stored as task-specific declarative knowledge,
are the key connecting variable between the perception of game
information and the decision to act in a certain way (Anderson,
1982; Lex et al., 2015; Johnston and Morrison, 2016; Birch
et al., 2019). Thus, when players have time, their search for
game information and their selection of a relevant capability
to act are both guided by knowledge-of their team’s tactical
approach (Mulligan et al., 2012; Richards et al., 2017). This
presents clear evidence that rugby players store and use memory
representations to perceive, interpret and act on tactics, roles
and responsibilities successfully (Poplu et al., 2008; Johnston
and Morrison, 2016; Schulz, 2018; Birch et al., 2019; Raab and
Araújo, 2019).
The elementary units of meaning comprised from player’s
knowledge-of the game all relate to the successful execution
of pre-planned intentions for performance (McPherson and
Vickers, 2004; MacMahon and McPherson, 2009). Our data
demonstrates that improved memory representations allow
players to form suitable plans of action, through tactics,
roles and responsibilities, which enhance their capability to
effectively perceive and operate in dynamic game environments
(McPherson and Vickers, 2004; Ashford et al., 2021). Such plans
of action guide perceptual strategies, the retrieval of memory
representations and subsequent action, for example, knowing
when, where and why to kick the ball up field in order to relieve
defensive pressure (McPherson and Vickers, 2004; Macquet and
Fleurance, 2007). These extended to the recall of knowledge-
of opponent’s tactics or individual tendencies to make effective
decisions during Fast-thought and Slow-thought verbalisations.
Interestingly, research has suggested that being consciously aware
of movement tendencies can be detrimental for anticipatory
performance (Memmert and Furley, 2007; Jackson et al., 2020).
However, such research has focussed on player’s ability to detect
deceptive intent in one vs one situations (Jackson et al., 2006,
2020). Whereas, in the context of this study, references made
to knowledge-of opponents by players were often made in
association to game situations where players had sufficient time
to make decisions, such as the lineout or scrum. Consequently,
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we encourage coaches and players to develop knowledge-of
opponent’s tactical tendencies to inform player decision making.
Knowledge-in the Game
Interpretation of these findings suggest that reference to
knowledge-in the game was made predominately during Fast-
thought verbalisations (Raab and Gigerenzer, 2015; Hafenbrädl
et al., 2016). Interestingly, players describe that they tend
to form expectations of what will happen based on their
assessment of game information (Macquet, 2009; Eccles and
Tran, 2012). In the first instance, this demonstrates that players
attempt to make sense of game information and engage in an
assessment of situational probability to successfully anticipate
an outcome (Eccles and Tran, 2012; Macquet and Kragba,
2015; Loffing and Cañal-Bruland, 2017; Helm et al., 2020).
However, the findings suggest that players were often inaccurate
when calculating situational probability from their assessments
of game information. Players described having to update
their perception of the situation as game information altered
before them (McPherson and Vickers, 2004). Macquet and
Fleurance (2007), Macquet (2009) would suggest that at this
moment, players would deem this information atypical and be
required to process available information in relation to formed
mental representations to generate an appropriate response.
Interpretation of these findings suggest that, in these instances,
players took the first viable option presented to them to quickly
satisfy the situation and remove risk (Johnson and Raab, 2003;
Raab and Gigerenzer, 2015). Interestingly, UNI players were
required to update and adapt to game incidents more often than
the PRO playing group. This is likely due to an over reliance
of the UNI playing group on sticking to tactical intentions
(Passos et al., 2008; Bourbousson et al., 2011); and PRO players
increased perceptual capability to form an accurate assessment
of situational probability (Eccles and Tran, 2012; Loffing and
Cañal-Bruland, 2017; Helm et al., 2020). Furthermore, Den
Hartigh et al. (2018) Skill Theory may offer some insight to
these findings. They compared the recall ability of selected
and non-selected soccer players to consider the complexity and
declarative knowledge base within verbalisations. Their findings
demonstrated that declarative knowledge was not dependent
of complexity or competitive level, suggesting a dissociation
exists between players declarative knowledge and knowledge-in-
action. This disassociation may explain the inaccuracies in both
populations to successfully assess the situational probability of
game situations (Den Hartigh et al., 2018).
Players recognised legitimate risks or threats to their
attacking or defensive integrity within Fast and Slow-thought
classifications, for instance, losing possession of the ball to their
opponents or conceding a try. Macquet and Kragba (2015)
found that elite female basketball player’s make sense of game
information to make decisions in two steps: (i) an assessment
of the situation and (ii) anticipation of situations as they
develop to manage risk. Similarly, our findings demonstrate that
a clear relationship exists between player’s sense-making and
decision making, as player’s knowledge-of the game seems to
guide their perceptual assessment of the situation (Del Missier
et al., 2010; Macquet and Kragba, 2015). Identifying risks and
threats coincided with sudden perceptual acknowledgement of an
opponent’s capability to disrupt momentum. Furthermore, these
verbalisations referenced incidents that occurred in fast paced
situations that disrupt player’s situational probability, such as an
opposing player attempting to steal the ball in a ruck situation,
(Ashford et al., 2021). Raab and Gigerenzer (2015) identify that
when humans are required to make decisions in time pressured
situations they tend to rely on heuristics, that is, bias of what has
worked before (Jackson et al., 2006). Consequently, when player’s
perceived legitimate risks or threats, they often used deeper
declarative knowledge-of the game to update their knowledge-in
the game as they took the first option that presented itself (Raab
and Laborde, 2011; Raab and Gigerenzer, 2015).
The influence of game context during player decision making
was verbalised by the PRO group more frequently than the
UNI group (González Víllora et al., 2013; Light et al., 2014).
Game context has been explored frequently in decision making
research, referred to as contextual priors (Mann et al., 2014;
Cañal-Bruland and Mann, 2015; Levi and Jackson, 2018;
Broadbent et al., 2019). For instance, Lenzen et al. (2009)
indicated that verbalisations derived from self-confrontation
interviews with handball players demonstrated that the score,
players involved, and match difficulty all influence the decision
making process. Johnson and Raab (2003) found that soccer
players think about their scoring potential (i.e., penetrate the
opponent’s defensive line and score) and their safety potential
(i.e., losing the ball or conceding) as they progress throughout the
game. Relatedly, Levi and Jackson (2018) indicated that player’s
extract dynamic contextual priors from game information that
effects their decision making process. Dynamic contextual priors
include the score status, feelings of momentum, assessment of
personal performance and external instruction from coaches
or teammates (Levi and Jackson, 2018; Gredin et al., 2019).
Our findings demonstrate regular moments where the PRO
group of players reflected on their offensive and/or defensive
momentum when making decisions. On occasion, descriptions
of momentum led to the suggestion that players felt levels
of situational favourableness, where the game felt completely
in their control (Levi and Jackson, 2018). In contrast, the
UNI group only make reference to game context in a state
of panic when the opposing team came back into the game,
demonstrating negative feelings of momentum. Offensive and
defensive momentum was often used by PRO players to make
informed assessments of risk associated within their decision
making (González Víllora et al., 2013; Light et al., 2014;
Macquet and Kragba, 2015).
Common Frame of Reference
Player’s common frame of reference was verbalised frequently
within Slow-thought decision classifications. Our findings
present evidence that both teams operate, coordinate and
communicate their decision making based on a shared mental
model of performance (See Table 2, Offensive situations,
scrum & lineout; Richards et al., 2012, 2017; Tee et al.,
2018). Players referred to game moments where the profound
use of a common language had many purposes during
individual and collective decision making (Richards et al., 2017).
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These included perceptual strategies such as; the guidance
of teammates perception; to inform teammates of perceptual
information they could not visually perceive; to allow players
to make sense of game information; to assess situational
probability; to identify threats and/or risks; and finally, to
notice sudden changes in expectations (Richards et al., 2012;
Ashford et al., 2021). Furthermore, our data suggests that a
common language was the key mechanism upholding each
team’s tactical “framework” they were working toward (McKay
and O’Connor, 2018). Consequently, our findings suggest that
a shared common language not only guides the perception
of players, but also initiates their decisions and actions in
an intentional pre-planned fashion. Specific common terms
often demanded the execution of particular tactical rules, roles
and responsibilities by both groups of players’ (McKay and
O’Connor, 2018). Thus, the deep declarative understanding of
a shared common language between players, connects their
perception of information to their individual and collective
actions-for the game, knowledge-of the game and knowledge-in
the game (Ashford et al., 2021). In turn, the consistencies in
the data raise a clear question regarding the current theoretical
differentiation between shared mental models (Richards et al.,
2012, 2017) and shared affordances (Silva et al., 2013) for
team coordination. In rugby union, they are, in fact dependent
on a deep declarative understanding of teammates capabilities
and a clear shared common language (Richards et al., 2012,
2017). Balagué et al. (2019) suggests that coaches should
imprint strategy with their player’s, which guides player’s
attention to perceive affordances. Subsequently, in relation
to the data demonstrated in this study, shared affordances
are a likely byproduct of tactical shared mental models
(Richards and Collins, 2020).
Interpretation of our data suggests that within key moments
(Tee et al., 2018), players used tactical rules, housed within
common terms, as either beneficial or detrimental for their
decision making performance (See Table 2 for raw data
examples). Raab (2003) suggested that the application of
decision making processes at an individual level may depend
on the cognitive complexity of different game situations. More
specifically, those who had developed explicit knowledge-of the
task were advantaged when cognitive complexity was high,
whereas those who had developed actions-for rather than
knowledge-of the task (i.e., implicit learning) were advantaged
when cognitive complexity was low (Raab, 2003). However,
our data suggests that player’s regarded time as the key
dependent variable for the application of decision making
processes over that of cognitive complexity (Raab, 2003).
Game moments such as the lineout, scrum and open phase
play offer player’s more time to make decisions and within
these moments player’s verbalised the perception of global
information, such as the opponents defensive picture (Johnston
and Morrison, 2016), the communication of a common term
(Richards et al., 2017) which actuated the coordinated execution
of tactical rules, roles and responsibilities for all players involved
(Del Missier et al., 2010; McKay and O’Connor, 2018). In
contrast, when player’s verbalised having limited time, such
as dealing with a threat at the breakdown, players recalled
perceiving discrete information, such as their opponents body
position (Macquet and Kragba, 2015) and tended to take
the first option presented to them (Raab and Laborde, 2011;
Raab and Gigerenzer, 2015).
Raw data examples emerging through self-confrontation
data indicates that players errors in judgement tended to
materialise when a misalignment occurred between the time
available to a player and their application of a cognitive
mechanism (See Table 2, Defensive situations). Verbalisations
regarding decisions in specific defensive situations highlight
that both groups of players followed a shared tactical rule,
which internalised the accepted responsibility to wait for one
opponents’ movement to finish before perceiving the next.
Frequently, these situations resulted in missed tackles by players
as their decision to perceive the second attacker came too late.
Here, the data presents that coaches have employed a top-
down shared mental model to guide player’s perception and
action through set roles and responsibilities in specific game
situations (Richards et al., 2012, 2017). However, interpretation
of our data suggests that players have on occasion become
blinded or paralysed by an over-reliance on a specific memory
representation that dictated their behaviour rather, than behaving
in response to game perception (Passos et al., 2008; Correia
et al., 2013). Players recalled being unable to anticipate the
deceptive movements of their opponents (Jackson et al., 2006),
unable to make sense of information to identify legitimate
attacking threats (Macquet and Kragba, 2015) and unable to
adapt quickly enough in response to their opponent’s movements.
Consequently, whilst player verbalisations suggest that such
decisions are still cognitively driven, in such incidents, a top-
down shared mental model can be overbearing if too prescriptive
and controlling of player behaviour (Steiner et al., 2017;
Ribeiro et al., 2019a,b).
CONCLUSION OF THE FINDINGS
The aims of this study were three-fold; (i) to consider how
game situations influence players perception of information;
(ii) to consider how game situations influence the application
of cognitive mechanisms whilst making decisions; and (iii)
to identify the influence of tactics and/or strategy on player
decision making. Players perception of game information, was
in large, dependent on the task or game situation (Roca et al.,
2011, 2013). When players had time, they often verbalised
global information, whilst as time decreased their perception
of information became more discrete (Johnston and Morrison,
2016; Basevitch et al., 2019). The application and use of
cognitive mechanisms varied from situation to situation,
however the majority of player verbalisations were found
to be cognitively driven by memory representations stored
as knowledge-of and knowledge-in the game (McPherson
and Vickers, 2004; Changeux, 2009; Johnston and Morrison,
2016; Richards et al., 2017). Memory representations were
often verbalised as the connection between the perceptual
search for information and an ideal action response, thus,
UNI and PRO rugby players often formed plans of action in
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regard to what to look for, hear or feel (Macquet, 2009; Lex
et al., 2015). Subsequently, if player’s initial assessment of
situational probability was accurate, players described having
time to consider options to come to an appropriate decision
(Macquet and Kragba, 2015). Finally, players consistently
verbalised the role of a shared common language which
implies that players coordinate perception and action by
communicating. This tactical focus suggests that players
are required to interpret verbal terminologies between
teammates, which identifies the existence and use of shared
internal mental representations (McPherson and Vickers, 2004;
Richards and Collins, 2020).
Conversely, player decision making was frequently verbalised
during Fast-thought decision classifications, where player’s
initial assessments of game situations were inaccurate. Players
response to these incidents often coincided with a rapid
ability to make sense of game information (Macquet and
Kragba, 2015) and a heightened capability to satisfy the
situation by taking the first option available to them (Raab
and Gigerenzer, 2015). In contrast, verbalisations of No-thought
decisions occasionally presented evidence of sub conscious
decision making made through feel or reaction. These findings
were interpreted in two ways, one as evidence of a direct
relationship between perception and action, where players
self-organised their behaviour implicitly in response to game
information without need for memory representations (Raab
and Araújo, 2019). Two, as evidence for neural embodiments
of meaning, where representations are formed from a network
of neurons that fire in synchronicity following the perception
of information (Changeux, 2009). Given the nature of player
descriptions the evidence seems to suggest that representations
still drive what the player needs to achieve in the decision
making process. Despite these interpretations, such descriptions
were infrequent and coincided with moments where players
had a split second to react to game information (less
than 200 decisions across both populations). Nonetheless, if
players are required to update, diagnose or self-organise to
game information, these incidents must be accounted for
in representative training environments (Passos et al., 2008;
Raab and Laborde, 2011).
Raab et al. (2019), suggested that the player’s perspective
must be considered when seeking to understand cognitive
mechanisms and decision making processes (Raab et al., 2019;
Gleeson and Kelly, 2020). Throughout the study there has
been an attempt to mitigate the fallibility of verbalisation
methods which included framing self-confrontation interviews
on a continuum of No/Fast/Slow-Thought. Furthermore, the
collection of unstimulated data facilitated cross-reference to
player’s responses to self-confrontation elicitation questions.
Despite these, the limitations of this approach are unavoidable
regarding the reliability of stimulated recall to explore player
decision making. It is also important that the limited references
made by players to implicit, self-organised decision making
processes are a likely consequence of this approach. Thus,
it is suggested that future study in this area looks to
integrate experimental and ecological task design alongside self-
confrontation interviews adopted in this study. That way, the
limitations of both methodological approaches can be considered
to enhance the trustworthiness of the findings.
Practical Implications
The data presents that player decision making in rugby union
may best be understood by considering the context in which
the decision is made (Simon, 1956). Whether implicit, explicit,
or through the presence or absence of cognitive mechanisms,
player decision making occurs relative to its environment within
a game situation (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2001; Gigerenzer and
Selten, 2002; Raab, 2003). Recently, Morgan et al. (2020) have
explored coaches’ perceptions of decision making in rugby
union and through semi-structured interviews indicated that the
coaches who participated stressed the importance of a balance
between structure and chaos when supporting the development
of their players’ decision making. They suggest that deliberate
coaching strategies, such as off-field video analysis, game-plans
and strategy were as equally important as questioning or the use
of game based representative scenarios. Practically therefore, in
relation to the findings from this study, we suggest that coaches
adopt two types of decision making training environments.
Firstly, the use of intentional decision making training (explicit
learning) should be adopted to develop cognitive decisions where
players know what information to search for and what action
is appropriate to satisfy the game information (Bar-Eli et al.,
2011). This may include explicit slow deliberate sense making
activities such as; video analysis sessions, previews and team
debriefs (Richards et al., 2012, 2017; Richards and Collins,
2020); coach led if–then rules of thumb (heuristics; McPherson,
1999; McPherson and Vickers, 2004) and the development of
individual and collective roles and responsibilities (McKay and
O’Connor, 2018) through tactical rules (McKay and O’Connor,
2018). Subsequently, we agree with Richards et al. (2012, 2017)
position that players should be encouraged to explicitly connect
their perception of information to their declarative knowledge-
of the game through slow and deliberate environments to make
better informed decisions in rapid competitive environments
(Ashford et al., 2021).
In contrast, the game presents player’s with incidents where
tactical intentions can no longer be referenced i.e., when players
have limited time or when game information demands a change
in expectations (Passos et al., 2008; McKay and O’Connor, 2018).
To support the betterment of player decision making in these
moments, coaches can utilise incidental decision making training
(Bar-Eli et al., 2011). This approach conforms to variable design
principles such as non-linear pedagogy (Chow, 2013; Correia
et al., 2019) in that practice provides frequent exposure to
the perception of information in order to identify invariances
between the information perceived and the action planned (Bar-
Eli et al., 2011). Furthermore, in such uncertain environments,
coaches should consider guiding players to adopt ‘take-the-
first’ heuristics (Raab and Laborde, 2011; Raab and Gigerenzer,
2015) through exploratory coach behaviours (e.g., divergent
questioning; Cushion et al., 2011; O’Connor et al., 2018) and
practice manipulation (e.g., rule modifications; Passos et al., 2008;
Chow, 2013; Balagué et al., 2019; Ashford et al., 2020).
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Following the interpretation of our data, we advise coaches
to consistently reinforce the following coaching strategies
within their practice. First, is the thoughtful development and
reinforcement of a common language, where all player’s (and
coaches) possess clarity of accepted verbal, visual and haptic
information (Richards et al., 2012, 2017; McKay and O’Connor,
2018). If players are able to conceptualise the meaning of
terminologies and how they are operationalised during games
and training, coaches may consider co-constructing further
development of language with the playing group (Richards et al.,
2012, 2017). A common language rests on ensuring clarity and
coherence between all involved, as a single term must mean
the same thing to one player and it does to everyone else.
Secondly, we suggest that an adopted common language should
be intertwined with a shared “way of playing” housed under a
clear common frame of reference (Tee et al., 2018; Ashford et al.,
2021). This does not suggest that coaches must prescribe how
players behave, but instead suggests that by imprinting strategy
(Balagué et al., 2019) coaches can offer a framework as a scaffold
for collective and coordinated decision making so players are
still able to search for, communicate, decide and act as the game
unfolds (Tee et al., 2018).
Thirdly, “What is tactically desirable must be technically
possible” (Launder and Piltz, 2013). Thus, coaches should
consistently seek to develop and refine technical and physical
capabilities of their players as they afford a wider scope of game
information to select from Paterson et al. (2013); Wilson et al.
(2018). With this, is a caveat that when supporting player’s
development of technique, coaches should not shy away from
decoupled, massed, blocked and instructional practices (Williams
and Hodges, 2005) but ensure that technique is then refined and
recoupled to game information. Finally, the findings of this study
demonstrate that player’s individual and collective perceptual
strategies, retrieval of memory representations, actions and
use of language are consistently underpinned by players deep
declarative knowledge-of the game (Anderson, 1982; Johnston
and Morrison, 2016). By supporting player’s game intelligence
and a deeper understanding of why, coaches can support players
development of self-awareness, meta-cognitive strategies (Price
et al., 2019, 2020); realistic evaluations of their performance
(MacNamara et al., 2010a,b); valid assessments of physical and
technical capabilities (Ashford et al., 2021); and finally, the ability
to consider game context during performance to make informed
decisions (Levi and Jackson, 2018).
To conclude, this study has presented a breadth of evidence
to suggest that game situations in rugby union impact semi-elite
players decision making processes in similar ways. In reference to
the thorough exploration of player decision making conducted
in this study, research should now extend further than semi-
elite playing populations and consider elite participants (i.e.,
Premiership & International players). Furthermore, study into
how to best support players development of decision making
must progress further than coach perceptions. Instead, we agree
with Morgan et al. (2020) conclusive remarks, that future research
with rugby union coaches should employ self-confrontation
elicitation interviews to explore how the demands of the game are
perceived and captured by the coach and impressed onto players
within effective learning environments.
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